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ABSTRACT

In this thesis paper, we survey the literature arising from Stephan Wolfram's
original paper, “Cryptography with Cellular Automata” [WOL86] that first suggested
stream ciphers could be constructed with cellular automata. All published research
directly and indirectly quoting this paper are summarized up until the present. We also
present a novel stream cipher design called Sum4 that is shown to have good randomness
properties and resistance to approximation using linear finite shift registers. Sum4 is
further studied to determine its effective strength with respect to key size given that an
attack with a SAT solver is more efficient than a bruteforce attack. Lastly, we give ideas
for further research into improving the Sum4 cipher.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Cryptography is a central component of information security. Financial and
medical information, business, political, and military strategies, and personal secrets all
require cryptography in order to maintain secrecy and integrity while in transit over
untrusted communication mediums. Cryptography is critical in maintaining order in our
current informationbased society; without strong barriers protecting information and
controlling access to it, society would surely descend into chaos.
In order for cryptography to be meaningful, it must be carried out in a unique way,
much like the security of a lock depends upon the fact that only authorized parties have
the corresponding key; if all locks used the same key, then a thief need only buy one lock
to get the key for all locks. While it is clear that uniqueness is certainly a major concern
for cryptographic systems, randomness is of equal importance. Should a cryptographic
system use keys with sequential ordering, then if one single key is discovered by an
attacker, then all the keys (both past and future) can be deduced. Thus, both uniqueness
and randomness are essential components to any cryptographic system. We study both
properties in this paper.
A cipher, or encryption function, either works upon a set number of bytes at a time
(called a block cipher), or by encrypting individual bits (called a stream cipher). While
4

block ciphers have enjoyed many years of practical use due to the United States
government's standardizations of the DES [NIS99] and AES [NIS01c] block ciphers, in
this paper we will focus on stream ciphers. While DES and AES have never been broken,
other systems over the years that were once thought to be secure have crumbled. For this
reason, it is prudent to invest efforts in redundant cryptographic systems as an application
of the wise defenseindepth security principle. Therefore, research into lesserused
stream ciphers remains highly relevant.
In this paper, we survey the literature arising from Wolfram's original paper in
1986 [WOL86] that suggested that cellular automata can be used to generate a keystream
for a stream cipher. In chapters 2 through 8, we summarize all papers that describe any
cryptographic primitive constructed using cellular automata. In chapter 9, we propose a
novel design for a stream cipher called Sum4 using cellular automata and analyze its
security properties. In chapter 10, we give ideas for future work on the Sum4 cipher.
Lastly, the paper is concluded in chapter 11.

1. 1 Definition of Cellular Automata
Cellular automata (CA) are finite state machines. They are composed as a set of
cells, ai, linked in space that are updated synchronously in time based on an update
5

function, f (sometimes called a transition function or rule). One of the most basic forms
of cellular automata are the socalled Wolfram cellular automata (WCA), which are
characterized by ait+1 = f(ati1, ait, ati+1), where ait is the cell at position i at time t. Each cell
is updated by incorporating itself and its left and right neighbors into f, which determines
its value in the next time step.
As each cell can hold two values (0 or 1), and that the update function takes three
cells as input, f can operate upon 23 = 8 different combinations of inputs. Thus, there are
223 = 256 different kinds of outputs for those inputs (i.e.: there are exactly 256 possible
rules for WCA). Each rule can be expressed as a decimal number, which represents its
output given all 8 possible inputs:

Figure 1.1. The outputs of rule 30 given its inputs. The squares each represent one cell.
A white square is a cell with value 0; a black square is a cell with value 1. The first row
of three cells is the rule's input, and the single cell below it is the output. Rule 30 is thus
given its name because of its output bits: 00011110 in binary is 30 in decimal.
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WCA are onedimensional because the cells are linked to left and right neighbors
only. Thus, they can be conceived as forming a straight line. Other types of CAs that are
actively studied are twodimensional CAs, where the cells also have top and bottom
neighbors, and are possibly connected to cells on the diagonal; these can be conceived as
forming a twodimensional grid.
Because practical CAs are finite in space, they must have extremities. Those
extremities lack the full number of neighbors that the update function requires (i.e.: the
leftmost cell in a onedimensional CA does not itself have a left neighbor). There are
several approaches to handle this situation. A CA is said to have a null boundary when
its extremities are hardcoded to have neighbors with value of 0. It said to have a
periodic, or cyclical boundary if the extremities are linked to each other.
Below is an illustration of a WCA with 256 cells updated with rule 30 having a
cyclical boundary and a random initial state:
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Figure 1.2. The top row represents the cells in their initial state (chosen randomly).
Subsequent rows represent those same cells after rule 30 has been applied to the row
above it.

CAs are not necessarily restricted to two immediate neighbors (i.e.: a radius of 1).
Work has been done to analyze the properties of CAs with a radius of 2 and 3 (see
[SER04], [BOU04], [MAR03b]). However, increasing the radius size too much destroys
the benefits of locality, which results in a more expensive hardware implementation.
A major advantage of CAs is that the cells can be updated entirely in parallel to
each other; they only depend upon the value of three previous cells. Thus, they can be
8

implemented very efficiently in hardware, with all cells updated synchronously with a
single clock cycle. In software, their parallelism can result in an efficient multithreaded
implementation that can take advantage of today's multiplecore CPUs.

1.2 Wolfram's Original Paper
Stephen Wolfram first proposed in 1986 that onedimensional cellular automata
could be used as a cryptographic primitive [WOL86]. He suggested that the state of the
CA can be initialized using a key, and that the output of a single cell through time is
cryptographically random for a certain equation (ai' = ai – 1 XOR (ai OR ai+1)) (also known
as rule 30), thus making the scheme suitable for use as a keystream generator.
Furthermore, he suggests that, given knowledge of an output stream, the problem of
deducing the initial state is in the class NP (since the problem of boolean satisfiability is
in class NP).
Ever since its publication, this paper has sparked an interest in the cryptographic
community for using CAs as primitives in stream ciphers, block ciphers, hash functions,
message authentication codes, and public key cryptosystems. The literature arising from
Wolfram's paper to the present is detailed in chapters 2 through 8.
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2. GENERAL LITERATURE

In this chapter, we examine general literature that has given interesting results
relating to CAs and cryptography. Several papers discuss how to use genetic
programming to locate optimal rules for generating random numbers. Others in this
chapter describe how to obtain CAs with certain properties such as maximal diffusion of
bits from an initial state, or how to obtain a CA with maximal period.
Sipper and Tomassini (1996) present a method for constructing a coevolving
algorithm for cellular programming, resulting in a nonuniform CA [SIP96]. Their co
evolving technique differs from previous genetic programming results from other
researchers [TOM95] mainly in that the fitness of each cell is dependent upon its
neighbors, instead of operating wholly upon independent populations and applying the
genetic operators only after a CA is computed completely. They present pseudocode of
the algorithm used to compute and evaluate rule maps, along with two specific rule maps
that were generated by it. Statistical analysis for randomness is presented on the co
evolved rule maps that show that they are at least as good as all previouslyknown CA
randomness output (via Wolfram's rule 30 [WOL86] and mixtures of rules 90 and 150
presented in [HOR89a] and [HOR89b]).
Koc and Apohan (1997) present an inversion algorithm use for cryptanalysis of
10

CA key generators [KOC97]. Given an nbit state of a rule 30 CA, the algorithm can
calculate the initial state in O(n) steps for certain seeds, or at most O(2n/2) for arbitrary
initial states. More importantly, their algorithm can calculate any initial state from any
onedimensional CA in at most 2(q1)(1a)n steps, where q is the number of neighbors and a
is the probability of agreement between the update function and the best affine function
that approximates it. The authors note that their algorithm can be applied in conjunction
with Meier and Staffelbach's attack [MEI91] in the following way: Meier and
Staffelbach's algorithm is first used on a bit stream to calculate one complete row in the
CA state, then Koc and Apohan's algorithm is used to invert the completed row so that the
key is found. The authors' algorithm shows that, to suggest a new keystream generator
using onedimensional CAs, one must check that the best affine approximation to the
update rule(s) has a low probability of matching.
Matsumoto in 1998 showed how to construct CAs with maximal periods by
making a small modification to Wolfram's rule 90 [MAT98]. Using rule 90 on cells with
a null boundary to the left and a mirrored boundary to the right (such that xm+1(t) = xm(t)),
he showed that there are 55 values of m (the number of cells in the CA) for 1 <= m <=
300 such that the period is equal to 2m – 1. Matsumoto further shows how to extend this
onedimensional CA into a twodimensional version. This result is significant because,
previously, to construct a CA with a maximal period, one would be required to randomly
11

search for primitive polynomials, which is a difficult task.
Tomassini, Sipper, and Perrenoud in 2000 submitted a method for generating non
uniform twodimensional CAs using genetic programming [TOM00a]. Starting with the
best CA evolved from their technique, they extended it by hand to produce a new CA that
outperformed all previously known twodimensional CAs. Tomassini, et al.
experimentally studied cycle lengths of twodimensional CAs and presented empirical
evidence suggesting that they increase exponentially with respect to the number of cells.
Furthermore, they note that their twodimensional CA does not require any timespacing
in order to achieve good randomness, whereas all previous onedimensional CAs show
lowered performance unless produced bits are excluded from the output stream.
Shackleford, et al., proposed in 2002 a new way to implement random number
generators in one, two, and threedimensional neighborhoodoffour CAs using field
programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) [SHA02]. Their designs are built around fourinput
lookup tables with a onebit register to efficiently exploit the nature of FPGAs. In their
physical design experiments, they predict that this results in a maximum clock frequency
between 214MHz and 230MHz. Furthermore, they show that their proposed CAs pass all
of Marsaglia's DIEHARD [MAR98] tests, as they include all the raw pvalues for the
reader to verify. Shackleford, et al, also provide experimental results suggesting a linear
relationship between the number of CA cells and the cycle length for their designs.
12

Seredynski, Bouvry, and Zomaya in 2003 used an evolutionary technique called
cellular programming to select and find a set of onedimensional CA rules that out
perform all previouslyknown onedimensional CAbased PRNGs in terms of quality of
randomness [SER04]. They discovered a set of eight rules (seven 1radius rules in
addition to one 2radius rule) that, when combined together, provide a stream of bits that
appears more random than any of those rules used individually; this surprising result
shows that strong PRNGs can be constructed from several weaker ones combined.
D'Antonio and Delzanno (2004) presented a method for encoding CAs into
propositional logic so that they can be processed by SAT solvers [DAN04]. They detail a
modular system that allows various queries to be constructed, most notably inverse
reachability, which would allow the computation of an initial state (key) given the bit
stream output. They show results from using their encoding methods to solve the boolean
CA expressions and the associated execution times using the zChaff [MOS01] SAT
solver. Their system allows one to test small versions of CAs to extrapolate practical
strength as well as compare CA designs against one another.
Oliveira, Coelho, and Monteiro (2004) examine CAs with bidirectional toggle
rules in [OLI04] and show that they achieve much more diffusion of plaintext bits into the
ciphertext as compared to the original proposal by Gutowitz in [GUT93]. Left toggle
rules are those such as rule 60 that only take into account the left and center bits of the
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neighborhood (rule 60 simply calculates the exclusiveOR of the left and center bits); rule
30 is bidirectional in that it accounts for both left and right neighbors. The authors
empirically show that when using bidirectional toggle rules, a single bit change in the
plaintext will cause half of the ciphertext bits to change. Furthermore, Oliveira, et al.
show that their method provides immunity from differential cryptanalysis. However,
while the original system had a key space of 2^2V1, using bidirectional toggle rules
lowers the key space to 2^2V2 (where V is the neighborhood size).
Xeulong, Jiwen, Manwu, and Fengyu in 2004 suggested a new design for non
uniform onedimensional CAs that incorporates a cell's value from a previous time step
[XUE04]. That is, while the traditional CA's update function consists of: si(t+1) =
f(si1(t),si(t),si+1(t)) (where s is the state of the CA, si(t) is the state of cell i at time t, and
f is the evolve function of the CA), their proposed “extended” CA design is defined as:
si(t+1) = fi(sit1, si1t, sit, si+1t). This represents a new technique that has never been used in
the design of CAs.
In 2005, Popovici and Popovici generalized Wolfram's rule 30 to use an arbitrary
number of states (powers of two) to create a reversible CA [POP05]. With this scheme,
they demonstrate how to construct a new cryptosystem using ideas from [LAF96], though
it lacks any kind of rigorous security analysis. The authors only show how the encryption
and decryption methods work, but do not show any results from randomness testing, In
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the conclusion, they merely state, “hopefully [this scheme] provides better
security.” [POP05]
Xuelong, Qianmu, Manwu, and Fengyu (2005) built upon their previous efforts in
[XUE04] along with genetic programming introduced by Tomassini et al. (in [TOM00a]
and [TOM01]) [XUE05]. They show that genetic techniques can locate extended CAs
that are suitable for cryptography, as the results from the Diehard tests ([MAR98]) are
presented. Unfortunately, their results are difficult to independently verify, as the specific
CAs they discovered genetically are not mentioned, nor are any raw data from the
statistical tests given.
Alvarez and Li (2006) present 17 guidelines for proposing new cryptosystems
based on chaotic systems such as cellular automata [ALV06]. In surveying published
research, the authors note that many proposed systems lack concrete details necessary for
cryptanalysis, and/or do not present enough information to show its viability in terms of
cost and efficiency. Alvarez and Li state that implementation performance such as
software runtime are necessities that are critical in demonstrating usefulness of the
cryptosystem. Their paper is useful for designers of new CAbased cryptosystems.
Delgado, Vidal, and Hernandez in 2006 extended Tomassini's cellular
programming technique in [DEL06] to include statistical tests to the fitness function in
addition to the entropy measurement already used; this helps eliminate unfit rules more
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quickly. This extended technique was used to examine nonuniform onedimensional
CAs between one and five arbitrary of neighbors. They discovered a rule (rule
2572018122) that appeared to perform as well as, or better than, wellknown
pseudorandom number generators that are actively used, such as ANSI X9.17, Blum Blum
Shub, and GDES. Significantly, they suggested that future CA designs can perform well
using nonlocalized neighbors.
Mukhopadhyay and RoyChowdhury (2007) study complemented group CAs
(those that contain XNOR logic, such as rule 153) and lay groundwork that is useful for
building cryptosystems upon them [MUK07]. Using matrix algebra, the authors present
proofs for calculating cycle lengths of CAs, which is a critical component for certain
cryptographic applications (as unknown or short cycle lengths could be a major problem
for a cryptosystem). The authors claim that the results of their paper would assist
designers of block ciphers and key agreement protocols since reversibility can be ensured
by utilizing half of a CA's known cycle length for diffusion functions; this would ensure
that progressing an additional halfcycle length results in the initial state. Mukhopadhyay
and RoyChowdhury suggest that the strengthening of CA primitives would help their
acceptance into mainstream cryptography.
As we have seen, there has been significant interest in genetic programming for
discovering configurations of CAs in situations that manual searching cannot be done
16

(i.e.: in the case of large neighborhood sizes). These techniques have produced good res
ults, and are likely to remain viable methods for studying CAs in the future.
Techniques for ensuring maximal period and maximal bit diffusion are critical
components for cryptographic systems. The papers presenting methods for ensuring
those properties are certainly invaluable for system designers.
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3. BLOCK CIPHERS

In this chapter, we report on the literature found regarding the construction of
block ciphers with cellular automata.
Srisuchinwong, York, and Tsalides (1995) introduce a symmetric block cipher
based on the novel idea of autonomous and nonautonomous CAs [SRI95]. Autonomous
CAs are those whose state transitions are not dependent upon external input; non
autonomous CAs mix in external input while computing a cell's next state. The authors
use an autonomous CA to compute session keys. The plaintext is used as an initial state
of a nonautonomous rule218 CA and evolved, taking inputs from the session keys into
consideration. Their resulting design gives a cipher that operates on 16bits of plaintext at
a time and uses a 96bit key. While the authors do suggest that a high rate of encryption
is possible (320Mbps on hardware clocked at a modest 20MHz), they unfortunately do
not present any security analysis in terms of linear cryptanalysis nor differential
cryptanalysis.
In 1997, Lafe studied how to use cellular automata transforms to compress images
as well using them to construct a block cipher [LAF96]. He suggests that transforms exist
which provide the avalanche effect, though he offers no evidence nor analysis. Very little
security analysis is presented; no discussion on linear cryptanalysis nor differential
18

cryptanalysis is included. In this paper, Lafe extends ideas from data compression into
the realm of security and suggests an avenue that can be further explored by future
research.
Shaw, Chatterji, Maji, Sen, Roy, and Chaudhuri (2001) propose a new technique
called “encompression,” consisting of data encryption and compression using CAs
[SHA01]. Specifically, the authors design an algorithm that is optimized for processing
video of human portraits. To compress the video, a technique called “vector
quantization” (or VQ) is used, which is claimed to be more efficient using a cellular
automata implementation. Encryption is done using the same technique as in [SEN03].
The authors show that realtime video compression and encryption can both be efficiently
realized using cellular automata in hardware.
Sen, Shaw, Chowdhuri, Ganguly, and Chaudhuri in 2002 [SEN02] presented a
new 128bit cellular automatabased block cipher using a combination of linear
transformations, an affine CA operation (using GF(28)), and a nonlinear, nonaffine CA
operation (also using GF(28)) to add security and overcome the problems encountered in
[NAN94]. The authors explain the security implications of each of the major
components; the initial linear transformation is noted to introduce a degree of randomness
to the input, the affine CA is noted to produce a very large set of outputs (2128), and that
the final key mixing step makes the block “totally unpredictable.” Sen, et al., empirically
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show that the block cipher is immune to differential cryptanalysis and also empirically
show that it surpasses both DES [NIS99] and AES [NIS01c] with respect to Shannon's
security quotient [SHA49]. Compared to the execution time of AES, the cipher is shown
to be approximately five times faster in software, and approximately eighteen times faster
in hardware.
Zhang and Li (2002) propose a hardwareoptimized block cipher based on a two
dimensional additive CA design [ZHA02]. Whereas the block cipher proposed in
[NAN94] uses n x m operations for encryption and decryption, the proposed cipher uses
n + m – 1 operations (where n is half of the CA group order and m is the number of
message blocks). The authors suggest that their design could be used for public key
cryptography when using Galois fields, though they do not show how this is possible.
Furthermore, the authors do not include a thorough security analysis of their cipher with
respect to linear and differential cryptanalysis; only the large key space is shown.
Because the authors reference the work done in [NAN94] several times, the reader would
naturally wonder if the attacks published on [NAN94] are applicable to this new design.
Unfortunately, Zhang and Li do not present any evidence showing that their cipher is
immune to those problems.
Sen, Hossain, Islam, Chowdhuri, and Chaudhuri (2003) propose a block cipher
very similar to the one in [SEN02] with the only notable change being a modification of
20

the nonaffine transformation step (the 128bit nonlinear group CA was replaced with a
“nonlinear reversible Control Major Not gate.”) [SEN03]. In this paper, the authors
present the cipher design as an efficient solution for embedded applications; it is noted
that the optimized software version of AES uses about 65 kilobytes of memory space,
whereas the proposed cipher uses only 3.8 kilobytes.
Srebrny and Such (2003) propose a block cipher using twodimensional CAs
[SRE03]. Their design uses three automata (two of which are irreversible), along with
geometric computations to help with the diffusion of bits. The first phase of encryption
of a 256bit block of plaintext involves setting the plaintext as the initial state of the main
32x8 CA, and using the symmetric key to configure the initial state and rules of the 2x8
and 32x8 auxiliary CAs; the evolution of the plaintext is dependent upon data extracted
from the evolved auxiliary CAs. Next, the main CA is diffused further using toggle rules,
and finally is mixed using transformations on 2x2 subsections. The authors provide
sufficient details on how their algorithm works, as well as an implementation that
encrypts Microsoft Word documents, though unfortunately, they do not present any
security analysis of their cipher; neither linear nor differential cryptanalysis are provided.
In 2003 and 2004, Bao showed that the block cipher proposed in [SEN02] was
insecure against a chosen plaintext attack [BAO03][BAO04]. Using only a couple
hundred chosen plaintexts, an efficient algorithm is presented that reconstructs the
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encryption and decryption transformation functions, resulting in a significant breakdown
of the cryptosystem. Bao also shows that minor changes to the design (such as adding a
permutation on the plaintext bits, changing the affine CA into a nonaffine CA, and/or
other changes) does not improve the security significantly; a complete redesign would be
needed to defend against the vulnerability.
Mukhopadhyay and Chowdhury (2004) propose a 128bit block cipher design
based on CAs that incorporates two nonlinear transformations in such a way that the
cyclical nature of the linear transformation is not disturbed [MUK04]. Using rule 153,
the authors show that a cyclical CA can be built, as its cycle length grows roughly instep
with the number of cells; this implements the linear part of the cipher. The nonlinear
parts of the cipher are simply Wolfram's rule 30. Unfortunately, the authors do not
present any security analysis whatsoever.
Seredynski and Bouvry in 2004 designed a symmetric block cipher using
reversible CAs [SER05]. Specifically, their cipher uses a 224bit key to operate on 64bit
blocks of plaintext over 16 rounds. Reversible CA s are pairs of CA rules that
complement each other such that evolving a state n times with one rule, then evolving the
resulting state another n times with its complementary rule will result in the original state
(thus it is termed 'reversible'). Seredynksi and Bouvry present a full block cipher design
in this paper detailing all aspects of operation along with experimental results showing
22

that the avalanche effect applies (i.e.: that a change in one bit of plaintext or key will
result in a change of at least 50% of the output bits). The authors present a short
cryptanalysis section discussing the presumed difficulty of a bruteforce attack on the
system.
Del Rey proposed in 2005 an entire cryptosystem based on CA [REY05]. His
design includes a new concept termed “reversible memory cellular automata” that
contains two properties: 1.) that the CA operations are reversible (i.e.: reverseevolution
is possible to obtain the initial state given an evolved state), and 2.) that the CA evolution
function takes several previous timesteps into consideration (four previous time states are
used in his actual algorithm), similarly to the design suggested by Xeulong in 2004. Del
Rey shows that the suggested block cipher is secure against bruteforce, ciphertextonly,
knownplaintext, and chosenplaintext attacks.
Liu, Cheng, and Wang (2005) present in [LIU05] another attack on the block
cipher proposed by Sen, Shaw, Chowdhuri, Ganguly, and Chaudhuri ([SEN02]). The best
known attack (by Bao in [BAO03],[BAO04]) showed that equivalent encryption and
decryption functions could be constructed given a couple hundred chosenplaintexts
along with small additional computations. In this paper, the authors show a more
efficient attack that requires only two chosen plaintexts and two quick computations that
results in a complete break in the system; several internal mechanisms that could not be
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previously discovered using Bao's attack can be computed, along with recovery of the
key.
Joshi, Mukhopadhyay, and RoyChowdhury proposed a block cipher in 2006
[JOS06] that built upon previous work in [MUK04]. They presented a novel way of
constructing a nonlinear Sbox using a nonlinear CA that is highly resistant to
differential cryptanalysis. Furthermore, their design includes a separate “diffusion
box” (Dbox) mechanism consisting of linear CA that is responsible for achieving the
Avalanche criterion. Key mixing is implemented using addition and subtraction in
GF(2n) (where n is the block size) so as to prevent linear cryptanalysis. The authors give
empirical evidence in their security analysis of the cipher that suggest high resistance to
linear and differential cryptanalysis as well as satisfaction of the Avalanche criterion.
According to Joshi, et al., this paper is the first to present a fullydetailed CAbased
cipher specifying all components necessary to allow its cryptanalysis, such as block size,
key size, key scheduling mechanism, etc.
Marconi and Chopard (2006) show how to construct a topology for a CAbased
block cipher called “Crystal” [MAR06]. It is suggested that twodimensional cellular
automata can be used to implement the generic functions that are specified in the
algorithm, leading to a cipher design that is pluggable in nature. The authors present
evidence that shows that the algorithm becomes increasingly more difficult to
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cryptanalyze given additional rounds of encryption. Unfortunately, the authors do not
fully specify how to construct a concrete system or how to apply twodimensional CAs to
the Crystal algorithm. No analysis is done regarding differential or linear cryptanalysis.
Sung, Hong, and Hong (2007) show that the block cipher proposed by Joshi, et al.
in [JOS06] is insecure due to its conjugate property [SUN07]. It is shown that any
plaintext can be easily decrypted using a chosenplaintext attack; by encrypting a
ciphertext 2n1 times (where n is the block size), the conjugate property in combination
with the involutional design results in the original plaintext.
As it has been seen, many block cipher proposals are not fully specified in terms
of key size, key scheduling, or defining certain functions within the cipher. As noted by
Bao in [BAO03] and [BAO04], this makes cryptanalysis much more difficult, if not
impossible (though he was still successful in cryptanalyzing the cipher by Sen, et al. in
[SEN02]). These unspecified ciphers are perplexing because they have no hope of
gaining acceptance by the cryptographic community since they cannot be implemented
and/or scrutinized, yet they have been published anyway.
Of the papers that have been fully specified, many of them have been broken.
And many of the published proposals do not sufficiently present evidence that they are
resistant to common attacks, such as linear and differential cryptanalysis. These, too, are
perplexing, as any respectable cipher design is not considered complete without
25

supporting evidence of its viability.
While it is apparent that block ciphers based on CAs are not yet mature enough to
be used in a production setting, it should not be considered the fault of the CA primitives;
the weaknesses seen in this chapter are not the result of the CAs themselves, but are
rather the result of general difficulty in designing cryptographic systems.
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4. STREAM CIPHERS

As noted before, stream ciphers with CAs were first proposed by Wolfram in
[WOL86]. This is perhaps the most natural fit for CAs in cryptography, due to the fact
that they can generate a stream of seeminglyindependent random bits. The bits can form
a keystream that can be combined easily to the plaintext with the XOR operation to
produce ciphertext, and later decrypted by XOR'ing the same keystream to the ciphertext
to recover the plaintext. In this way, the stream cipher contains a design similar to that of
the provablysecure onetime pad (OTP). Though the OTP requires a truly random
source while CAs are pseudorandom, in theory a CAbased stream cipher can have an
upperbound security value dependent upon its cycle length (which in some cases is 2n,
where n is the number of cells). An upperbound value in security helps set a goal that
designers can attempt to achieve.
Unfortunately, stream ciphers have been passed over in favor of block ciphers. No
stream cipher has been standardized by the U.S. government, unlike the block ciphers
DES [NIS99] and AES [NIS01c] As a result, stream ciphers have not been subjected to
the same rigorous public review that block ciphers have enjoyed, with the exception of the
RC4 stream cipher (which, strangely enough, has never been officially published, though
an unofficial description is available in [ANO94]) that is used in practical systems such as
27

Transport Layer Security [DIE06] and Wifi Protected Access [IEE04].
Regardless, stream ciphers are still of interest within academic circles, and can be
practical in implementing a defenseindepth strategy. In the unlikely, but highly
disruptive event that a standardized block cipher is broken, a wellreviewed stream cipher
can be a viable alternative. For that reason, we are drawn to the literature of CAbased
stream ciphers.
Meier and Staffelbach (1991) demonstrated an attack on stream ciphers built using
rule 30 [MEI91]. Their knownplaintext attack exploits the patterns in the bit sequence
adjacent to the keystream that are generated by rule 30 to more effectively reconstruct the
initial CA state. They empirically show that the effective key size of a 200bit key is 14.5
bits, with respect to a 50% chance of successfully recovering that key. Extrapolating their
results, they suggest that a key size approximately 750 to 900 bits long has an effective
size of only 50 bits; this is much smaller than the key space of 2750 to 2900 previously
thought those keys would occupy.
Nandi, Kar, Chaudhuri in 1994 presented three new CA designs: one for a block
cipher, and two for stream ciphers [NAN94]. Their novel block cipher design revolves
around the use of rules 51, 153, and 195 to generate an alternating group to construct a set
of fundamental transformations. These transformations are used in conjunction with a
programmable CA (PCA) design, which relies on a separate control structure to select the
28

active rule configuration. Nandi, et al., show that it is resistant to ciphertextonly attacks
as well as known and chosen plaintext attacks. Their first stream cipher is described as a
PCA with ROM; the readonly memory (ROM) holds a sequence of rules to program the
CA structure with; it is designed in such a way to be highly efficient in terms of VLSI
design. Their second stream cipher is described as a twostage PCA, consisting of a
controlling CA structure whose output programs another CA's active rule; both are
suggested by the authors to either be uniform, or hybrid configured with rules 90 and 150.
While no empirical evidence is presented regarding the randomness of the keystream, the
authors do show how their stream cipher designs are resistant to known ciphertext and
known plaintext attacks.
Blackburn, Murphy, and Paterson in 1997 showed that the block cipher and stream
ciphers presented by Nandi, et al., in [NAN94] are weak [BLA97]. They point out that
the block cipher is constructed entirely of affine transformations, which implies that the
block cipher itself is affine. The first stream cipher (i.e.: PCA with ROM) is shown to
be insecure due to its low linear complexity; the keystream can be determined in
complexity O(L2l), where L is the number of cells in the PCA and l is the number of rules
in the ROM. Lastly, Blackburn, et al., present a method to recover the key used in the
twostage PCA stream cipher assuming a small amount of the keystream is known in
time O(2L+2), compared to O(23L) suggested by Nandi, et al. A further observation is
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presented that suggests that this cipher is of linear complexity.
Mihaljevic showed in 1997 ([MIH97b]) a ciphertextonly attack against the PCA
with ROM cipher presented in [NAN94]. By exploiting the linear structure of the cipher
following the use of rules 90 and 150, he showed that the effective strength of the secret
key of length L(l + 1) (where L is the number of cells in the PCA and l is the number of
rules in the ROM) is upperbounded by log2(lL + 2L – 1). Mihaljevic presents an efficient
algorithm to deduce the secret key given only ciphertext.
Mihaljevic (1997) gives an improvement in [MIH97a] to the PCA with ROM
stream cipher design originally proposed in [NAN94]. By adding an unspecified time
varying permutation to the bit stream output, the generator is shown to be resistant to the
attack in [MIH97b]. However, it is noted that tradeoff to this security improvement is a
speed slowdown by a factor of n (where n is the number of cells in the CA). Mihaljevic
also shows a novel cryptanalytic algorithm with attempts to reconstruct nonoverlapping
parts of the initial state/secret key by analyzing parts of the output stream. Evidence is
presented that shows that the new improvement is secure against this novel attack if the
number of cells in the CA is greater than 120.
Mihaljevic, Zheng, and Imai in 1998 [MIH98b] extended the results in [CAT96] to
construct a fast cryptographic keystream generator. The authors show how to combine a
linear CA over GF(q) with principles of general stream cipher design such as time variant
30

nonlinear mapping/filtering and the shrinking principle in a novel way such that
weaknesses in the individual designs are not present in the final result. The security of
their proposal is examined, with suggestions that it is immune to all previously known
attacks, as well as robustness against general problems such as low complexity (which
would allow a simpler equivalent generator to be constructed), small period, or weak
statistical properties (though note that the paper merely references other works and does
not directly show the reader).
Tomassini and Perrenoud (2000)[TOM00b] suggested a design for a one
dimensional hybrid CA keystream generator that is resistant to the attack by Meier and
Staffelbach in [MEI91]. Their proposed design involves using the key to also program the
CA's rule vector using rules 90, 105, 150, and 165 (shown to make a good PRNG in
[TOM00a]). The authors prove that using the attack in [MEI91] on this method would
require 2(5n9)/2 attempts (where n is the number of cells in the CA) in order to recover the
key. Furthermore, their analysis shows that expanding their design from one to two CA
dimensions results in an even greater resistance to attack (though the increase is not
explicitly specified).
Tomassini and Perrenoud (2001) extended their results in [TOM00b] by applying
the same genetic programming algorithm in [TOM00a] to the problem of finding good
one and twodimensional nonuniform generators that are suitable for cryptography
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[TOM01]. Because there are many more possibilities for nonuniform twodimensional
CAs, the authors suggest that genetic programming is best suited for finding good
pseudorandom generators. As in [TOM00b], the authors show that their discovered CAs
are resistant to the attack presented by Meier and Staffelbach in [MEI91]. Unfortunately,
the exact twodimensional CA structures are never explicitly listed by the authors, and
thus their results are not easily reproduced, nor verified.
Badr (2002) illustrated a cryptogram incorporating a stream cipher along with
reversible CAs and CA transform functions [BAD02]. Unfortunately, no specific details
are presented regarding how any of the CA functions are constructed, nor is any security
analysis given.
Bouvry, Seredynski, and Zomaya (2003) extended the results in [TOM00b] and
[TOM00a] by applying the same genetic programming algorithm in [TOM00a] to the
problem of finding good onedimensional nonuniform generators that are suitable for
cryptography [BOU03],[SER03]. The authors discovered that the radius1 rules 86, 90,
101,105, 150, 153, 165 along with the radius2 rule 1436194405 generate random streams
with high entropy and pass the chisquare test, serial correlation test, and the FIPS 1402
tests [NIS01b]. The rules passed all 23 of the DIEHARD tests [MAR98], whereas the
rules proposed in [TOM00b] pass only 11 of them. Furthermore, the authors show that
their scheme has a higher key space (8N * 2N) compared to the design of [TOM00b] (4N *
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2N).
Len, Encinas, Encinas, White, del Rey, Sanchez, and Ruiz (2003) study all of the
radius1, onedimensional uniform automata (a.k.a. the Wolfram cellular automata) and
their applicability to cryptography [LEN03]. Beginning with all 256 rules, bit streams
are generated and evaluated against five statistical tests: the frequency test, the serial test,
the runs test, the autocorrelation test, and the poker test. Of the 21 rules that passed the
statistical tests, 12 of them were found to contain sufficient linear complexity. The
authors then show a generic algorithm based on Meier and Staffelbach's attack in
[MEI91] that works against the 12 remaining rules to recover the initial state/key.
Because of this, it is concluded that Wolfram cellular automata are not suitable for use as
stream ciphers.
Franti, Slav, Balan, and Dascalu (2004) present hardware schematics detailing the
construction of a 4rule programmable CA stream cipher that can be adapted and
extended to implement a specific design [FRA04]. Their work can be used as a starting
point to construct a custom hardwarebased stream cipher.
Rubio, Encinas, White, del Rey, and Sanchez (2004) study the use of hybrid linear
CAs for use as stream ciphers [RUB04]. Starting with all seven onedimensional, radius
of one rules (a.k.a. the Wolfram ruletype), the authors craft pairs of rules that pass basic
pseudorandom tests, then submit the remaining eleven linear rule pairs to more stringent
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tests. The eleven pairs are run multiple times through the serial test, poker test, run test,
and autocorrelation test in periodic and nullboundary conditions. It was found that the
(60,90), (90,150), and (150,240) pairs passed all tests.
Bouvry, Klein, and Seredynski (2005) show that the keystream generator in
[SER04] can generate patterns if keys with a certain pattern are used [BOU05]. They
suggest that a working implementation of the generator should check the key to ensure
that the pattern is not present, as any key that contains that pattern is a weak key. The
authors also note that there is no proof that there are no more key patterns that produce
the same result. It is suggested that an implementation check the entropy of the key itself
before accepting it.
Szaban, Seredynski, and Bouvry (2006) reexamined the set of CA rules proposed
in [SER04] since it was found in [BOU05] that “some specific assignments” could lead
“to bad statistical quality” [SZA06a],[SZA06b]. Using a genetic algorithm, ten hybrid
onedimensional CA consisting of five radiustwo rules were found to produce sequences
of high entropy that also pass the FIPS 1402 statistical tests [NIS01b]. Even though the
DIEHARD tests [MAR98] were not used, nor any other statistical testing suite, the
authors nevertheless claim that their discovered rule sets are suitable for use in a key
stream generator.
The papers centering on stream ciphers have demonstrated several key points that
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future designers must acknowledge. The attack by Meier and Staffelbach in [MEI91]
shows that information regarding neighboring cells is sensitive and can be exploited to
find the key. Any future keystream generator must ensure that this attack does not apply.
Secondly, we now know that no Wolfram cellular automata (i.e.: onedimensional, one
radius CAs) are suitable for cryptographic use from Len, Encinas, Encinas, White, del
Rey, Sanchez, and Ruiz in [LEN03]. Lastly, we are made aware by Bouvry, Klein, and
Seredynski in [BOU05] that keystream generators based on CAs can contain weak keys,
though a general method to deduce them is still not known.
It should be noted that most papers in this chapter do not directly show any results
of randomness testing. Of the ones that do, the criteria which the tests are based upon are
not given. This makes their claims of randomness less than convincing. Future designs
must include both the results as well as the criteria upon which they were found.
A key observation relating to the novel work done in chapter 9 is that the hybrid
design by Tomassini and Perrenoud in [TOM00b] seems to provide good protection from
the attack by Meier and Staffelbach in [MEI91]. This point has influenced the process in
designing the Sum4 cipher described in chapter 9.
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5. HASH FUNCTIONS

Several authors have suggested designs for constructing a hash function based on
CAs, including the highprofile cryptographers Damgård and Daemen (separately). CAs
seem to lend themselves nicely to hash function designs due to their regular nature and
high parallelism.
Damgård (1990) proposes a way to construct a 128bit output hash function using
rule 30 over 512 cells [DAM90]. To ensure that collisions are difficult to compute, he
proposes that the message is padded with a random constant 256bit string, then used as
the initial state. After iterating 256 generations, a stream of 128 bits is taken as the hash
of the message block and XOR'ed together with the previous message block. Damgård
presents a proof that the padding significantly hinders attempts in computing collisions,
but an algorithm to do this was nevertheless discovered by Daemen, et al, in [DAE93].
Daemen, Govaerts, and Vandewalle (1993) in [DAE93] show how to find colli
sions with Damgård's CAbased hash function presented in [DAM90]. They also present
their own 257bit hash function called Cellhash that uses rules 30 and 150 to provide bit
confusion and diffusion, respectively, along with a final permutation to ensure that every
bit of each generation g is dependent upon every bit of generation g3 in a nonlinear way.
Using ideas from differential cryptanalysis, the authors show that confusion is sufficiently
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achieved, as small changes in the CA state results in many possible difference patterns,
each with a very small probability after few rounds. Lastly, Daemen, et al., suggest that
the Cellhash algorithm is highly efficient in hardware, as they conservatively estimate
that 0.3 Gb/s is possible using only a 10MHz clock.
Mihaljevic, Zheng, and Imai (1998) propose a DaviesMeyer type hash function
using programmable linear additive CAs [MIH98a]. Their design uses a CA to imple
ment both the compression function as well as the output function. Interestingly, the out
put function is a variation of the keystream generator proposed in [MIH97a]. An accom
panying security analysis shows that the compression and output functions are immune to
preimage, second preimage, and collision attacks, as well as other known attacks. The
hash function is shown to be fast, with an efficient hardware implementation suggested.
The authors note that their hash function is significantly faster than dedicated hash func
tions such as MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, and HAVAL.
Mihaljevic, Zheng, and Imai in 1998 extended the results in [CAT96] to construct
a fast cryptographic iterative hash function using linear CA over GF(q) [MIH98c]. Their
design uses a CA to implement both the compression function as well as the output func
tion. An accompanying security analysis shows that they are immune to preimage,
second preimage, and collision attacks. The hash function is shown to be fast, with an
efficient hardware implementation suggested. Aside from their novel designs for the
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compression and output functions, this work is notable for proposing a word oriented
hash function using CAs instead of previously proposed bit oriented hashing.
The work done in the area of hash functions with CAs is of higher quality than in
other domains. Authors proposing hash algorithms have provided full specifications as
well as indepth security analyses, paving the way for acceptance by the mainstream
cryptographic community. While the U.S. government already has standardized hash
algorithms, in recent times the National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST)
has called for proposals for a new hashing standard to protect against new weaknesses
found [NIS07]. It is entirely plausible that the work done in this field could be applied to
the task and a proposal be filed for a new hashing standard based on CAs.
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6. MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODES

Two papers have explored the use of CAs to generate message authentication
codes (MACs). The general idea behind them is to use the plaintext as the initial state,
then evolve the CA a certain number of steps to compute the MAC while mixing in key
information.
Dasgupta, Chattopadhyay, and Sengupta (1999) propose a design for creating a
message authentication code (MAC) using linear rules 90 and 150 [DAS99]. By arran
ging an nbit CA in a twopredecessor singleattractor (TPSA) configuration (where each
state as exactly two predecessors), a secret key is set to the initial state and nbit blocks of
the message are used to configure the rule vector for each time step. To increase com
plexity and to ensure that the resulting MAC is not all zeros, an additional complemented
evolution is performed before loading the next nbit message block. The final CA state is
the MAC, which is dependent upon the key and the message. The authors show that, due
to the TPSA design, 2k possibilities for the initial state/key exist for any message and
MAC pair (where k is the number of nbit message blocks). However, the difficulty of
modifying any parts of the message is not discussed nor analyzed. Thus, the security of
their scheme is unknown.
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Mukherjee, Ganguly, and Chaudhuri in 2002 [MUK02] show how to construct a
message authentication code (MAC) using CAs over GF(2p). They point out that their
scheme is immune to brute force attacks since the message digest length and key length
can be variable. It is also immune to the Extension attack (also called the Paddle attack),
as well as a variation of the differential cryptanalysis attack (that would enable the discov
ery of the secret key through observation of the differences in digest pairs). Mukherjee,
et al., further show that their scheme can be used to construct sensitive watermarks into
digital images. However, the system has been successfully cryptanalyzed by Lee, Hong,
and Kim in 2006. Lee, et al. showed that Mukherjee's (et al) system is vulnerable to a
chosenmessage attack due to its inherently regular design [LEE06].
While the idea of constructing a MAC with CAs seems promising, the fact that
only two papers have been published on the topic (one of which lacks the necessary
security analysis, and the other which has been broken), clearly shows that it is not
headed towards any practical result. Nevertheless, this area seems ripe for future
research, as CAs are known for their efficiency in parallel hardware which is attractive for
MACs.
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7. PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY

The application of CAs to publickey cryptography is an interesting idea.
Unfortunately, only one paper on the topic has been published in over twenty years,
suggesting that it is largely an academic or abstract idea.
Guan, in 1987, proposed the firstever method of designing a publickey
cryptosystem with cellular automata [GUA87]. He suggests that by combining a set of
multifold linear invertible rules together, the resulting function is no longer partially
linear. This fact would allow a public key to be made out of the combination, as the
private key (the individual functions of the rule) would be very difficult to compute.
Guan presents a small example illustrating the concept, but does not give any rigorous
security analysis, nor does he show how encoding for arbitrarysized messages can be
efficiently accomplished. Furthermore, no method to efficiently generate public keys is
given.
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8. GRAPHICS CRYPTOGRAPHY

A small group of researchers have published several CAbased cryptosystems that
are specifically crafted for digital images. As twodimensional CAs can be easily
constructed to exactly match a twodimensional image in length and width, they can be
naturally combined in order to achieve diffusion, confusion, or authentication.
Maranon, Encinas, Encinas, del Rey, and Sanchez (2003) propose a cryptosystem
for graphical color images using twodimensional reversible CAs [MAR03b]. In their
system, the image is used as the initial seed for the twodimensional CA, and the Blum
Blub Shub (BBS) pseudorandom generator is used as a keystream. A radius of two
around each pixel, not including that pixel (resulting in a neighborhood size of 24) is
taken into account by the updating function along with the BBS stream in order to
encrypt that pixel. Only one generation is computed to encrypt the image. The authors
note that no expansion of the plaintext occurs and that no loss of information happens,
unlike previous graphics cryptography designs. However, the authors do not present any
security analysis whatsoever as to the viability of their design to resist attacks.
Surprisingly, the authors present an image and its associated ciphertext which seems to
contradict their assertion that their algorithm is useful for cryptography; the ciphertext
appears to contain visible artifacts left over from the plaintext.
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Maranon, Encinas, and del Rey (2005) introduce a (n, n)threshold secret image
sharing scheme (where an image is split into n tokens among n parties such that all n
parties must agree to contribute their token in order to reconstruct the original image) us
ing reversible two dimensional CAs [MAR05]. The original image is loaded as the CA's
initial state, and is evolved using linear rules that incorporate previous time steps (other
than the immediately previous state; these are termed linear memory cellular automata, or
LMCA). The trusted share distributor will compute the tokens by evolving the initial
state (original image) using different transition functions over different parts of the ori
ginal image. The original image is thus recovered by reversing the evolution of the tokens
and combining them all to recover the image. The authors show that this cannot be done
unless all n tokens are combined, otherwise no information is leaked (i.e.: that it is a per
fect scheme). It is also demonstrated that their scheme is resistant to statistical analysis in
that the tokens are uniformly distributed.
Encinas, del Rey, and Sanchez (2005) propose an image authentication protocol
using two dimensional reversible CAs [ENC05]. Specifically, their system will use a ran
dom image as the initial state, then set the first and second states to the first and second
halves of the image, respectively. A transition function that incorporates the previous
three time states is run in order to generate a MAC that is half the size of the image. The
authors provide a detailed security analysis, showing that their scheme satisfies the ava
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lanche effect, that the generated fingerprints have a uniform distribution, and that it is col
lision resistant as well as being preimage and second preimage resistant. While the size
of the MAC is linear with respect to the source image, the authors note that this may be
changed to a constant size with future research.
Cryptographic functions that operate only on images are interesting from the
academic perspective, but are of little practical use in the real world. The need for
specialpurpose encryption on images is easily dwarfed by the need for generaluse
encryption that can operate on arbitrary data such as information in a database, network
protocols, or on general data files. Nevertheless, the work done in this field might one
day be applied in mainstream methods.
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9. A NOVEL CIPHER DESIGN: THE SUM4 CIPHER

9.1 Influence and Design
Now that we know what work has been published regarding cryptography with
cellular automata, we present a novel stream cipher design that resists all known attacks
in the literature.
While performing the literature search, our attention was drawn to the attack on a
stream cipher based on rule 30 described in [MEI91] by Meier and Staffelbach in 1991.
This attack depends upon the fact that a single rule is in effect for all generations and that
rule 30 is partially linear, which leaks some information about the neighboring cells.
From there, an attacker can use information from the neighboring cells and keystream to
deduce information about the key. As a result, the key size must be increased greatly in
order to be secure against the attack.
Tomassini and Perrenoud suggested in 2000 that a hybrid stream cipher can be
constructed by assigning rules 90, 105, 150, or 165 to each of the cells, where the initial
state and rule assignment both consist of the key [TOM00b]. They show that this thwarts
the attack in [MEI91].
We propose an idea similar to [TOM00b]. However, instead of assigning each cell
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a static rule at setup time, we propose that all cells use a single rule that is changed each
generation based on control bits. In order to preserve the balance of 0 and 1 bits in the
state of the CA, we choose to use rules that have an equal number of 0 and 1 outputs.
Collectively, we term these rules the sum4 rules.
Figures 9.1, 9.2, and 9.3 show sample sum4 rules. The black squares represent
cells with a value of 1; white squares represent cells with a value of 0. The row of three
squares represents the rule inputs, and the square below them is the rule's output:

Figure 9.1. Rule 30's inputs and outputs.

Figure 9.2. Rule 204's inputs and outputs.
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Figure 9.3. Rule 90's inputs and outputs Notice that its outputs are symmetrical.

It was found through exhaustive search that there exist 70 sum4 rules. Of them, 6
are symmetrical in that reversing their outputs results in the same rule (such as rule 90).
Removing the symmetrical rules, we are left with 64 sum4 rules. They are: {15, 23, 27,
29, 30, 39, 43, 45, 46, 51, 53, 54, 57, 58, 71, 75, 77, 78, 83, 85, 86, 89, 92, 99, 101, 105,
106, 108, 113, 114, 116, 120, 135, 139, 141, 142, 147, 149, 150, 154, 156, 163, 166, 169,
170, 172, 177, 178, 180, 184, 197, 198, 201, 202, 204, 209, 210, 212, 216, 225, 226, 228,
232, 240}. A onedimensional, cyclicalboundary, radius1 control CA using rule 30 can
be used to generate six random bits each generation by sampling six evenlyspaced cells.
These bits are given to the rulecontroller, which selects between the 64 sum4 rules. The
currently active rule is then applied to the cells of the main CA, which is another one
dimensional, cyclicalboundary, radius1 CA containing the same number of cells. The
first cell in the main CA each generation is sampled into the keystream output. An XOR
operation between the plaintext bits and the keystream results in ciphertext; XOR'ing the
ciphertext with the keystream again results in the original plaintext (this is called a
Vernam cipher [VER26]).
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The table that translates bits from the control CA into the active rule number for
the main CA is below:

Control CA

Main CA

Control CA

Main CA

Control CA

Main CA

Control CA

Main CA

Output

Rule

Output

Rule

Output

Rule

Output

Rule

000000

15

010000
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100000

77

110000

105

000001

240

010001

116

100001

178

110001

150

000010

23

010010

51

100010

78

110010

113

000011

232

010011

204

100011

114

110011

142

000100

27

010100

53

100100

83

110100

135

000101

216

010101

172

100101

202

110101

225

000110

29

010110

54

100110

85

110110

139

000111

184

010111

108

100111

170

110111

209

001000

30

011000

57

101000

86

111000

141

001001

120

011001

156

101001

106

111001

177

001010

39

011010

58

101010

89

111010

147

001011

228

011011

92

101011

154

111011

201

001100

43

011100

71

101100

99

111100

149

001101

212

011101

226

101101

198

111101

169

001110

45

011110

75

101110

101

111110

163

001111

180

011111

210

101111

166

111111

197

Figure 9.4. The control CA bit output to active main CA rule lookup table.

In figure 9.4, notice that the sum4 rules are not in ascending order. In the early
stages of designing the cipher, each rule was paired up with another rule whose output is
the reverse of the first. For example, rule 30's output is 00011110, and its reverse is
01111000, which is rule 120. These pairings were unintentionally preserved throughout
testing, and while this ordering is not believed to have an effect on the properties of the
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keystream generator, we report them here in case this belief is incorrect and for the
purpose of completeness.
The table in figure 9.4 is used to implement the sum4 array in figure 9.5:
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Figure 9.5. The Sum4 cipher with 12 cells.
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Figure 9.5 shows the Sum4 keystream generator with 12 cells. The control and
main CAs are initialized with a 24bit key (001110110010011100100011). The first
generation is computed by transitioning the control CA using rule 30. Six equallyspaced
cells are sampled (shaded in gray) to create an index into a table of the 64 sum4 rules (as
described in figure 9.4). The selected rule is made the active rule for the main CA, which
is used to transition the key into the first generation. The first cell of the main CA
(shaded in gray) is sampled and added into the keystream output. Likewise, the second
and third generations are computed, resulting in keystream output of 100.
This design is more secure than [TOM00b] against the attack described in
[MEI91] because an attacker that recovers part of the keystream does not know what
rules created the bits. Without this knowledge, an attacker has a harder time deducing the
values of the neighboring cells.
It is hypothesized that this design could be augmented slightly to allow multiple
cells per generation to be sampled without sacrificing security. This would allow
multiple keystreams to be generated from roughly the same amount of computation or
multiply the throughput of the cipher. As this hypothesis could not be tested due to time
constraints, it is suggested as a course of future work in chapter 10.
Henceforth, this design shall be referred to as the Sum4 cipher.
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9.2 Testing Environment
All testing was performed on a 32bit Intel Core 2 Duo T5500 CPU clocked at
1.66GHz with 2 GB of RAM on the Ubuntu Linux 7.10 operating system (kernel version
2.6.2214). All computer programs are singlethreaded and run on one CPU core only.
The C compiler used is gcc version 4.1.3 20070929. The Java runtime environment and
compiler are both IcedTea build 1.7.0b21.

9.3 Randomness Testing
A keystream must be random in order to be secure. If an attacker can predict the
future output of the keystream, then they can decrypt ciphertext, resulting in security
failure. Ideally, an attacker must not be able to accurately predict even one bit in the
entire keystream.
When we initially approached the issue of randomness testing, it was not clear
what software program to use. The literature most often used Marsaglia's DIEHARD test
suite [MAR98], though there also exists Brown's DieHarder suite (which is a re
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implementation of Marsaglia's version under the GNU Public License [FSF91] along with
extra tests), and NIST's Statistical Testing Suite (STS) [NIS01a]. Thus, the first step was
to run all three suites on the keystream output from the Sum4 cipher and compare the
results.
NIST's STS was hypothesized to be the best suite, as NIST should be able to
marshal professional resources into publishing highquality results. We were very
surprised to find out that the STS was very poorly constructed. The implementation
suffered from multiple critical problems. The documentation does not help the user
understand how to invoke the program, nor understand what its options mean. It was
found that the UNIX version often crashes or produces “underflow errors.” The
Microsoft Windows version does not even load due to missing DLL files under Windows
XP. After these DLL files were later installed from public, untrusted sources, it was
found that the summary of the test results were not properly listed, as individual tests
would produce a result, but they would not be reported upon later (though the fact that
untrusted DLL files were used could be a factor—however, this was the only way to make
the program even functional). The Windows version could not be recompiled from
source code due to syntax errors. These problems affected all versions of STS, ranging
from the initial 1.5 version to the latest version 1.8. In effect, the STS was found to be
useless in randomness testing.
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Next, Brown's DieHarder suite was considered. It was markedly better in quality
than STS, though it revealed a few issues that brought into question its viability. Several
tests are marked as unstable, suggesting that the suite is more of betaquality than
productionquality. As compared to Marsaglia's version, Brown's version took
significantly more time to analyze the same input—about 7 times longer. Upon closer
inspection, it was found that this was due to the way DieHarder retests the same blocks
of bytes many more times, then applied multiple layers of statistics to them. Effectively,
it gathered statistics on statistics, then reported the end result based on the metastatistics.
This explained why the same reimplemented tests in DieHarder were reporting many
more failures versus the original DIEHARD. Lastly, DieHarder's “Countthe1's” test
was entirely incorrect; it reported a failure because the Sum4's output supposedly had
many more 1bits than 0bits. DIEHARD reported no such problem, and we created a
custom program to verify that the output was indeed balanced. This outcome strongly
suggested that DieHarder was not a good choice for randomness testing.
Thus, DIEHARD remained as the only viable randomness testing suite available
at our disposal. However, no actual published test results from it could be found. Few
papers surveyed in chapters 2 through 8 mentioned doing randomness testing at all. Of
the ones that did, DIEHARD was used, though none of them presented the raw results,
nor compared test results to those from a generator with known randomness properties.
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This meant that the output of DIEHARD in and of itself could not yield definitive
information; we would need to compare DIEHARD's results for the Sum4 cipher against
its results for generators with known good output. Only then could we determine if the
Sum4 cipher's output was random enough to be used in cryptography.
It should be noted that the DIEHARD suite outputs pvalues for each of its tests.
Pvalues are derived from test statistics that can be used to reject the null hypothesis
(which, in this case, is that the generator outputs are random). The pvalue is the
probability that the test statistic would have a value greater than or equal to the observed
value if the null hypothesis is true.
We found two published, noncryptographic generators (also by Marsaglia) that
are claimed to have good randomness properties: the Multiple With Carry (MWC)
generator [MAR03a] and the Xorshift generator [MAR03a]. For each generator (along
with the Sum4 cipher), twenty 257megabyte files of random numbers were created.
Each file was analyzed using 14 of the 17 tests in the DIEHARD suite (three of them—
the Tough Birthday Test, Up Down Runs Test, and OPERM5—were skipped because the
meaning of their results could not be determined). The number of test failures were
tabulated by generator (the less number of failures, the better the randomness). Unlike
any published paper reviewed in chapters 2 through 8, we specify the criteria for passing a
randomness test: if more than 10% of the twotailed pvalues resulting from a single test
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(as some tests produce over 20 raw pvalues) are greater than 0.975 or less than 0.025,
then the test has failed at the 5% level. Otherwise, the test has passed. Similarly, for one
tailed pvalues, if more than 10% of them are less than 0.05, then the test has also failed
at the 5% level; otherwise the test has passed.
As DIEHARD merely presents the user many raw statistics, we edited its source
code to output test success or failure based on the criteria specified above. Strangely, it
was found during this time that no obvious distinction was made either in the program
output or the source code whether the pvalues reported were one or twotailed. It
seemed as though Marsaglia assumed that the user would be an experienced statistician
that would intuitively sort out the nature of the pvalues in the sea of output. Thus,
research was conducted to determine the type of pvalues reported so that the pass/fail
criteria could be properly applied. This revealed that twotailed pvalues were used in 14
of the 17 tests; unfortunately, the nature of the pvalues from 3 tests (the Tough Birthday
Test, Up Down Runs Test, and OPERM5) could not be determined from reading the code.
Therefore, we only used the 14 tests whose pvalues were understood (see Appendix A for
a description of these tests).
Below are the results of the DIEHARD tests on the MWC, Xorshift, and Sum4
generators:
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MWC DIEHARD Results
Test Name
Overlapping Sums

Bad pvalues

Total pvalues

10

20

Pct. Bad pvalues
50.0

Overall
Birthday spacings

No. Failures
10
5

4

20

20.0

4

Countthe1's (specific)

29

500

5.8

4

OQSO

31

560

5.5

3

GCD

3

40

7.5

3

Craps Test 2

3

40

7.5

3

26

460

5.7

3

Binary rank (32x32)

2

20

10.0

2

Gorilla

2

20

10.0

2

Parking lot

2

20

10.0

2

15

400

3.8

1

OPSO

Bitstream test
Binary rank (6x8)

1

20

5.0

1

33

620

5.3

1

Craps Test 1

0

40

0.0

0

Countthe1's (stream)

0

20

0.0

0

3D Spheres

0

20

0.0

0

Minimum Distance

0

20

0.0

0

Binary rank (31x31)

0

20

0.0

0

Squeeze

0

20

0.0

0

TOTAL:

161

2880

5.6

44

DNA
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Xorshift DIEHARD Results
Test Name
Overlapping Sums

Bad pvalues

Total pvalues

Pct. Bad pvalues

No. Failures

7

20

35.0

7

34

500

6.8

6

Birthday spacings

4

20

20.0

4

3D Spheres

4

20

20.0

4

Minimum distance

4

20

20.0

4

24

560

4.3

3

Binary rank (32x32)

3

20

15.0

3

Countthe1's (stream)

3

20

15.0

3

27

460

5.9

3

3

20

15.0

3

Countthe1's (specific)

OQSO

OPSO
Squeeze
Overall

3

Craps Test 1

2

40

5.0

2

Bitstream test

19

400

4.8

1

Parking lot

1

20

5.0

1

Gorilla

1

20

5.0

1

Craps Test 2

1

40

2.5

1

Binary rank (6x8)

1

20

5.0

1

Binary rank (31x31)

1

20

5.0

1

GCD

1

40

2.5

1

DNA

37

620

6.0

0

177

2880

6.1

52

TOTAL:
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Sum4 DIEHARD Results
Test Name
Overlapping Sums

Bad pvalues

Total pvalues

Pct. Bad pvalues

No. Failures

7

20

35.0

7

OPSO

29

460

6.3

4

OQSO

32

560

5.7

4

Countthe1's (specific)

29

500

5.8

4

3

40

7.5

3

Craps Test 2
Overall
Birthday spacings

1
1

20

5.0

1

DNA

26

620

4.2

1

GCD

1

40

2.5

1

Binary rank (31x31)

1

20

5.0

1

Binary rank (6x8)

1

20

5.0

1

Bitstream

18

400

4.5

0

Squeeze

0

20

0.0

0

Craps Test 1

0

40

0.0

0

3D Spheres

0

20

0.0

0

Minimum Distance

0

20

0.0

0

Countthe1s (stream)

0

20

0.0

0

Binary rank (32x32)

0

20

0.0

0

Parking lot

0

20

0.0

0

Gorilla

0

20

0.0

0

148

2880

5.1

28

TOTAL:

Figure 9.6. Results of DIEHARD test runs on twenty 257megabyte random
number files for each of the MWC, Xorshift, and Sum4 generators. The number
of failing (“Bad”) pvalues for each test across the twenty files is reported, along
with the total number of pvalues and the percentage of “bad” ones. The
number of overall test failures is presented, based upon the reported scoring
criteria. Note: the pvalues for the “Overall” test are not tabulated because
DIEHARD records all pvalues internally and performs its own final test on
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them.

Observe that the Sum4's total number of test failures (at 28) is less than the total
number of test failures for both MWC (at 44) and Xorshift (at 52). Also note that the
Sum4's percentage of failing pvalues (at 5.1) is slightly less than both MWC's
percentage (at 5.6) and Xorshift's percentage (at 6.2).
Lastly, the twenty 257megabyte files for the MWC, Xorshift, and Sum4
generators were analyzed by the ENT test program [WAL98]. For each file of each
generator, the test reported an entropy of 7.999999 bits per byte.
Thus, with respect to the DIEHARD testing suite against the MWC and Xorshift
generators, the Sum4 cipher exhibits superior randomness properties. All three
generators have high entropy.

9.4 Running Time Versus Number of Cells
A good measurement of performance for a cipher would be how fast it can encrypt
plaintext and decrypt ciphertext. Because encryption and decryption are the same in the
Sum4 cipher (by XORing with the keystream), only encryption measurements are
presented:
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No. of Cells

Running Time (seconds)

32

5.0

64

10.3

96

14.7

128

19.6

160

23.6

192

28.8

224

32.8

256

32.7

288

37.0

320

43.6

352

45.9

384

52.2

512

69.7

Figure 9.7. Running time for encrypting 1 megabyte of plaintext using various cell sizes.
These results are measured using a computer program written in the C language with a
static plaintext block compiled in.
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Running Time vs. No. of Cells
For Generating a 1 Megabyte Stream
60.0

Time in seconds

50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
32

64

96

128

160

192

224

256

288

320

352

384

Number of Cells

Figure 9.8. Increasing time for encrypting 1 megabyte of plaintext as the number of cells
increase. The linear regression line (y = 0.1268x + 2.4818) is shown, having a
correlation coefficient of 0.9951.

These results show that generating a 1megabyte keystream from the cipher is
very slow. This can be attributed to its software implementation and not necessarily its
design. This issue and how it can be resolved is discussed further in chapter 10: Future
Work.
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9.5 Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) Approximation Testing
A linear feedback shift register (LFSR) is a wellknown random number generator
that is vulnerable to a knownplaintext attack when used as a keystream generator. It can
be modeled by computing a linear boolean expression over a register of finite size,
outputting the bit result, then shifting the output back into that register. For example,
consider a 4bit register (denoted by x3, x2, x1, x0) initialized to 1011. If we use the
equation x4 = x1 XOR x0, then the first output bit will be 0. This value is then shifted into
x3, which causes x3 to be shifted into x2, etc.; x0 is discarded entirely. After generating
one output bit, the register state will be 0101. A second iteration yields an output of 1
with a register state of 1010. A third iteration yields an output of 1 with a register state of
1101. This action is shown in below in Figure 9.9:
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Figure 9.9. The evolution of a linear finite shift register (LFSR). The squares in gray are
the registers whose values are outputted.
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Massey's algorithm [MAS69] inputs a bit sequence, and outputs an LFSR
equation that, when executed, outputs the bit sequence input. Using a knownplaintext
attack to recover the keystream from an LFSR, this algorithm can be used to predict all
future keystream bits, resulting in a major cryptographic vulnerability. Thus, LFSRs are
not suitable for use in cryptography. Furthermore, Massey's algorithm can be useful in
checking if an LFSR can approximate the keystream of a stream cipher; if so, then the
stream cipher is clearly weak. We shall attempt this against the Sum4 cipher.
To see if a 256register LFSR can approximate the Sum4 cipher, the following
steps are performed:

1. Two 256bit blocks (S1, S2) are read in from a file containing a keystream.
2. S1 is fed into Massey's algorithm, resulting in an LFSR that produces S1.
3. The LFSR is used to generate another 256 bits, S3.
4. The number of matching bits in S2 and S3 are counted and outputted.
5. Continue to Step 1, unless keystream file is exhausted, or process is terminated.

In this testing, we used version 2.10 of the SAGE opensource software (available
on the Internet at <http://www.sagemath.org/> as of April 16, 2008) to execute Massey's
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algorithm.
The above algorithm counts how many bits out of 256 that an LFSR
approximation can accurately predict. Below are the test results for the Sum4 cipher
with 256 cells in each of the control and main CAs:

Total number of bits tested:

158,334,976

Number of matching bits:

79,164,434

Percentage of matching bits:

49.998%

Chisquare:

0.2356

Twotailed pvalue with 1 degree of freedom:

0.6274

Figure 9.10. Results for 256bit LFSR approximation of the Sum4 cipher with 256 cells.

Because the LFSRs predicted the output of the Sum4 cipher approximately 50%
of the time, they are no better than simple guessing. According to these results, the 256
cell Sum4 cipher cannot be approximated by 256bit LFSRs.

9.6 SAT Solver Testing
Because the cell state in a new generation of a CA is determined by applying a
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boolean equation to cells in the previous generation, the entire CA can be expressed as a
large system of boolean expressions. As such, it is possible to use a SAT solver
application to encode a segment of a discovered keystream (recovered using a known
plaintext attack) into a boolean expression that represents the CA. This would allow an
attacker to compute all cell values in the CA, including the key (which is the initial state).
For a strong CAbased cipher, a designer would hope that an attack with a SAT solver
would result in an infeasible amount of computation time for a reasonablysized key.
The specific SAT solver used in this phase is zChaff [MOS01] v2007.3.12. zChaff
only operates on files containing boolean expressions in conjunctive normal form (CNF).
CNF expressions purely consist of conjunctions of clauses, where the clauses are
disjunctions of literals. For example, the expression AB + ~C (where AB denotes A AND
B, A + B denotes A OR B, and ~A denotes NOT A) is not in CNF because it is not valid to
distribute the literal C across a conjunction of literals A and B. However, the expression
can be converted into CNF using DeMorgan's Law: (A + ~C)(B + ~C). In fact, any
expression can be converted into CNF.
Rule 30 has the expression D = A XOR (B + C), which is not in CNF. Aside from
applying DeMorgan's Law, to convert to CNF we may examine its truth table:
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A

B

C

D

0
0

0
0

0
1

0
1

0

1

0

1

0
1

1
0

1
0

1
1

1

0

1

0

1
1

1
1

0
1

0
0

Figure 9.11. The truth table for rule 30, where the output is D and the inputs are A, B,
and C.

By taking the rows for which D = 0, and negating the input literals that equal 1 then
ORing them together, we form a single clause of disjuncted literals. Combining all these
clauses with ANDs will then result in rule 30's CNF equivalent. Specifically, the first
row in figure 9.11 has D = 0, so we create a clause with (A + B + C). The last three rows
have D = 0, so inverting the input literals that are 1 give (~A + B + ~C), (~A + ~B + C),
and (~A + ~B + ~C), for the fifth, sixth, and seventh rows, respectively. Finally, the
clauses are all ANDed together to yield the CNF expression: (A + B + C)(~A + B + ~C)
(~A + ~B + C)(~A + ~B + ~C).
While we have demonstrated how to encode a single rule 30 equation into CNF, an
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extra step is needed to encode a CA based on rule 30 into a CNF expression. Specifically,
the output variable itself must be included so that future generations have something to
reference. This is done by constructing another truth table that treats the output variable
D as yet another input, and outputs a 1 when rule 30 applied on A, B, and C equals D:

A

B

C

D

X

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

0

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

Figure 9.12. The truth table for the expression where (A XOR (B + C) = D') AND (D =
D').

Converting the truth table in Figure 9.12 to CNF using the method described above, we
get:
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(A + B + C + ~D)(A + B + ~C + D)(A + ~B + C + D)(A + ~B + ~C + D)(~A + B + C + D)
(~A + B + ~C + ~D)(~A + ~B + C + ~D)(~A + ~B + ~C + ~D)
Figure 9.13. The boolean expression in CNF for the truth table in Figure 9.12.

With the expression in Figure 9.13, we can encode a onedimensional, oneradius CA
based on rule 30 with the following algorithm:

1. Assign n unique boolean variables to the initial n cells. Place the variables into an
orderpreserving array named previousGeneration.
2. Create an empty orderpreserving array named currentGeneration.
3. Create a string variable named cnfString and initialize it to the empty string.
4. Compute the CNF expression for the current generation of the CA.
1. Retrieve the three input variables from previousGeneration that determine the
value of the current cell in the current generation (for the first cell, the left
variable is taken as the rightmost variable in previousGeneration for CAs with
cyclical boundaries; for the last cell, the right variable is taken as the leftmost
variable in previousGeneration for the same reason) and name them A', B', and
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C '.
2. Assign a new string variable named tmpR30 a copy the expression in Figure
9.13.
3. Substitute A, B, and C in tmpR30 for A', B', and C '.
4. Choose a new unique boolean variable, D', add it to currentGeneration in the
current cell position, and substitute it for the variable D in tmpR30.
5. Combine the tmpR30 to cnfString using an AND operation. Reset tmpR30 to
the empty string.
6. Loop to step 4.1 while there exist more cells to handle in the current
generation. Otherwise, set previousGeneration to currentGeneration, clear
currentGeneration, and continue to step 5 below.
5. Loop to step 4 while there are more generations to compute. Otherwise, output
cnfString and terminate.

To illustrate with a small example, consider a 6cell, onedimensional, oneradius
CA with cyclical boundaries using rule 30 as its transition function. Initializing the
algorithm above, we first create the previousGeneration array and assign it the values {A,
B, C, D, E, F}, which represent the values of the initial state (i.e.: the key). We also
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create the currentGeneration array then set it to {} (the empty set), and create the
cnfString string set to “” (the empty string). We begin to compute the next generation,
starting with the first cell (cell number 0). We retrieve variables F, A, and B from
previousGeneration, as they determine the value of the first cell (they are retrieved by
using indices (0 – 1 = 5 (mod 6)), 0, and (0 + 1 = 1 (mod 6)), respectively). Next, we
copy the equation from Figure 9.13 into the string tmpR30, and substitute A, B, and C
within it for F, A, and B, respectively. We choose G as a new unique boolean variable and
substitute it for D in tmpR30 and add G to the currentGeneration array. We combine
tmpR30 to cnfString using an AND operation (though since cnfString was empty, it
simply becomes a copy of tmpR30). A diagram of the current state is in Figure 9.14:
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Figure 9.14. The state of the algorithm after it has assigned a boolean variable to the
first cell, G, of the first generation after the initial state (A, B, C, D, E, F). At this step,
the cnfString variable is set to:
(F + A + B + ~G)(F + A + ~B + G)(F + ~A + B + G)(F + ~A + ~B + G)(~F + A + B + G)
(~F + A + ~B + ~G)(~F + ~A + B + ~G)(~F + ~A + ~B + ~G)

Continuing on to compute the next cell (cell number 1), we choose the three input
variables that determine it by looking up indices (1 – 1 = 0 (mod 6)), 1, and (1 + 1 = 2
(mod 6)) in previousGeneration, which correspond to A, B, and C, respectively. These
are substituted, like before, along with the next new and unique boolean variable, H,
resulting in the state shown in Figure 9.15:
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Figure 9.15. The state of the algorithm after it has assign a boolean variable to the
second cell, H, of the first generation after the initial state (A, B, C, D, E, F). The CNF
expression calculated for this cell is:
(A + B + C + ~H)(A + B + ~C + H)(A + ~B + C + H)(A + ~B + ~C + H)(~A + B + C +
H)
(~A + B + ~C + ~H)(~A + ~B + C + ~H)(~A + ~B + ~C + ~H)
This expression is ANDed to the cnfString variable to produce:
(F + A + B + ~G)(F + A + ~B + G)(F + ~A + B + G)(F + ~A + ~B + G)(~F + A + B + G)
(~F + A + ~B + ~G)(~F + ~A + B + ~G)(~F + ~A + ~B + ~G)(A + B + C + ~H)(A + B
+ ~C + H)(A + ~B + C + H)(A + ~B + ~C + H)(~A + B + C + H)(~A + B + ~C + ~H)
(~A + ~B + C + ~H)(~A + ~B + ~C + ~H)

As it can be seen, encoding an ncell CA over g generations yields an expression
with (n * g) boolean variables and (n * g * 8) clauses of disjuncted literals.
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While the above method does in fact encode a CA into a CNF expression,
processing the expression through a SAT solver would not reveal any useful information,
as it would merely find a satisfying assignment of variables for no particular output. An
attacker is not interested in this, but rather would want to find the key used to create a
keystream from the CA (or, at the very least, discover some intermediate boolean
variables so that the rest of the state can be reconstructed more easily). To do this, the
attacker would recover a part of the keystream using a knownplaintext (or chosen
plaintext) attack. These keystream bits would then be encoded into the CNF expression
so that the SAT solver would find the key that produced those bits. With the key, the
attacker could decrypt any ciphertext encrypted with that key, resulting in critical failure
of security.
Note that the expression in Figure 9.13 is true if and only if D is the output of A
XOR (B + C). To modify that expression so that the output is 1, only one term needs to
be added:
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(A + B + C + ~D)(A + B + ~C + D)(A + ~B + C + D)(A + ~B + ~C + D)(~A + B + C + D)
(~A + B + ~C + ~D)(~A + ~B + C + ~D)(~A + ~B + ~C + ~D)(D)
Figure 9.16. The CNF expression for rule 30 for which the output is 1. The end clause in
bold is the only addition to the expression in Figure 9.13 necessary to encode the 1 value.

Likewise, the following is the expression in Figure 9.13 modified so that the output is 0:

(A + B + C + ~D)(A + B + ~C + D)(A + ~B + C + D)(A + ~B + ~C + D)(~A + B + C + D)
(~A + B + ~C + ~D)(~A + ~B + C + ~D)(~A + ~B + ~C + ~D)(~D)
Figure 9.17. The CNF expression for rule 30 for which the output is 0. The end clause in
bold is the only addition to the expression in Figure 9.13 necessary to encode the 0 value.

Encoding a CA with the methods described above have been verified to solve for
the initial state (key) when processed by a SAT solver.
The Sum4 cipher uses rule 30 to power its control CA, which is used to provide
random bits to drive the main CA's rule selector. A knownplaintext (or chosenplaintext)
attack does not yield any information about the control CA since the keystream is taken
from the main CA. As a result, an attacker could only encode bits into a CNF expression
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from the main CA only. Therefore, an extension to the methods above is needed to
properly encode the Sum4 cipher.
To encode the Sum4 cipher, the control CA is encoded as described above, but
with six output variables sampled per generation for encoding the main CA's rule
selector:
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Figure 9.18. The sum4 rules being multiplexed into the new value of a Main CA cell
based on control variables from the Control CA.

As can be seen in Figure 9.18, the variables from the three cells in the main CA
that determine the value of the new cell are substituted into the CNF expressions for all
64 sum4 rules, yielding 64 output variables. Those output variables are fed into a 64
to1 multiplexer that selects one output based on six control variables taken from the
control CA, mimicking the action of the rule selector.
The CNF expressions for the 64 sum4 rules were generated using a computer
program to generate the truth table for each, then computing the CNF expression from it
(see the boolgenrules.php script accompanying this thesis paper). The CNF expression
for the 64to1 multiplexer could not be generated either by hand, nor by a computer
program, as the truth table contains 70 variables (64 inputs and 6 control inputs) which
would result in 270 rows. Instead, we built a 64to1 multiplexer by chaining smaller 2
to1 multiplexers whose CNF expressions are easily derived. The following illustrates
how this is done:
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Figure 9.19. An 8to1 multiplexer built by chaining 2to1 multiplexers together.
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Figure 9.19 shows how 2to1 multiplexers can be chained together to create a larger 8
to1 multiplexer. A 64to1 multiplexer can easily be created by extending this scheme.
As we have described how the control CA is encoded along with the 64 sum4
rules, multiplexer, and the method by which the output bits can be encoded (into the main
CA), we have fully specified the CNF encoding process of the entire Sum4 cipher.
An implementation of the Sum4 CNF encoder has been written in Java that
outputs a file format that is used by the zChaff SAT solver [MOS01]. It was used to
generate expressions for CA sizes 6 through 20, inclusive, for both the control and main
CAs. The size of the CNF file on disk was recorded for each CA size, as well as the
amount of memory zChaff used and the time zChaff required to solve it.
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zChaff
CA Size

Size of CNF File (MB) Time to Solve

zChaff

zChaff

Time to Solve (seconds)

Memory Used (MB)

Log2(Time)

Log2(Memory)

6

1.1

1s

1

29.6

4.8875

7

1.6

1s

1

48.4

5.5969

8

2.2

3s

3

87.6

9

2.8

2s

2

76.0

1.0000

6.2479

10

3.5

6s

6

148.4

2.5850

7.2133

11

4.3

10s

10

212.4

3.3219

7.7306

12

5.2

49s

49

593.1

5.6147

9.2121

13

6.1

1m29s

89

910.0

6.4757

9.8297

14

7.2

2m16s

136

818.1

7.0875

9.6761

15

8.3

5m42s

342

2,462.1

8.4179

11.2657

6.4529

16

9.4

9m31s

571

3,235.0

9.1573

11.6595

17

10.7

17m51s

1071

2,796.3

10.0647

11.4493

18

12.0

1h11m36s

4296

2,172.5

12.0688

11.0851

19

13.4

3h01m59s

10919

Unknown

13.4146

Unknown

20

14.9

10h45m08s

38708

Unknown

15.2403

Unknown

Figure 9.20. Resources needed to analyze the Sum4 cipher expressed as boolean
expressions with various cell sizes using the zChaff SAT solver [MOS01].

The size of the CNF file on disk grows linearly. The memory usage was measured using
the Valgrind v3.2.3 software [SEW00], invoked as: valgrind tool=memcheck zchaff
file.cnf (Valgrind is a debugging suite whose “memcheck” tool provides information such
as dynamic memory usage).
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zChaff Memory Usage vs. Cell Size
Base2 Logarithm of Memory Usage (MB)

14.0000
12.0000
10.0000
8.0000
6.0000
4.0000
2.0000
0.0000
6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

Cell Size

Figure 9.21. Increasing memory usage of SAT solver with respect to cell size of Sum4
cipher (notice that the Yaxis is the base2 logarithm of the memory usage in megabytes,
thus memory is increasing exponentially, not linearly). The linear regression line (y =
0.6008x + 1.4289) is shown, having a correlation coefficient of 0.9729.

Memory usage for cell sizes 19 and 20 could not be measured since the Valgrind tool
adds extra time overhead. To complete the memory measurement with cell size 18
required over 24 hours. Furthermore, this time was increasing exponentially, suggesting
that cell size 19 would require about 34 days.
A graph showing the running time required to solve the CNF expressions versus
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the number of cells is below:

zChaff Running Time vs. Cell Size
Base2 Logarithm of Running Time
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Cell Size

Figure 9.22. Increasing running time of SAT solver with respect to cell size of Sum4
cipher (notice that the Yaxis is the base2 logarithm of the running time, thus time is
increasing exponentially, not linearly). The linear regression line (y = 1.1717x +
(9.1888)) is shown, having a correlation coefficient of 0.9898.

As it can be seen, increasing the number of cells in the control and main CAs results in an
exponential increase in the time required to find the key. Note that the Yaxis is the
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base2 logarithm of the time in seconds, thus a linear increase in the graph is actually an
exponential increase in time. This behavior is desired in a secure system since a small
increase in the key size results in a very large increase in effort required by an attacker to
find that key. This data is used in section 9.7 below to estimate how large the key should
be in order to be secure.

9.7 Effective 128bit Security
It is suggested in [SCH03] that a key size of 128 bits provides enough bruteforce
security to preserve secrecy up to 50 years into the future. By comparing the amount of
time required to recover the key using a SAT solver with the amount of time required to
bruteforce all keys, one can compute how many cells are necessary that would force an
attacker to use the same amount of resources as a 128bit bruteforce attack.
Below are the results from running a bruteforce attack against the Sum4 cipher:
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Cell Size Time (Java program)

Time (C program)

Log2(Time [C program]) (in secs)

6

0s

0s



7

1s

0s



8

1s

0s



9

4s

1s

0.0000

10

19s

3s

1.5850

11

1m23s

14s

3.8074

12

6m21s

1m04s

6.0000

13

29m34s

4m58s

8.2192

14

2h21m55s

22m57s

10.4273

15

11h21m12s

1h49m25s

12.6806

16

Unknown

8h07m43s

14.8368

Figure 9.23. Computation time needed to bruteforce a Sum4 cipher with various cell
sizes using computer programs written in Java and C.

Notice that the bruteforce implementation using the C language is much faster than the
Java language implementation. For this reason, we will only use the results from the C
program.
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Base2 Logarithm of Running Time (C Program)

Brute Force Running Time vs. Cell Size
16.0000
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Figure 9.24. Increasing running time of bruteforce attack against the Sum4 cipher
using a computer program written in the C language. The linear regression line (y =
2.1597x + (19.801668)) is shown, having a correlation coefficient of 0.9994.

To show the effectiveness of the SAT attack versus the bruteforce attack, we combine the
graphs from Figures 9.21 and 9.23:
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Brute Force and SAT Times vs. Cell Size

Base2 Logarithm of Running Time

16.0000
14.0000
12.0000

Brute Force

10.0000

Linear regression for
Brute Force

8.0000
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6.0000
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0.0000
9
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13

14

15
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Cell Size

Figure 9.25. The combination of the graphs from Figure 9.22 and 9.24 showing that the
SAT attack is more efficient than bruteforce.

By calculating a linear regression for the SAT and bruteforce results, we can
estimate information for larger cell sizes. We can then extrapolate how many cells are
necessary to ensure that the moreefficient SAT attack will take as much time as a brute
force attack over 128 bits.
The linear regression line for the SAT attack, using time information for cell sizes
9 through 16, inclusive, is:
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y = 1.1717x + (9.1888)
The linear regression line for the bruteforce attack (using the C program) for the same
cell sizes is:
y = 2.1597x + (19.8017)
Therefore:
y = 2.1597(128) + (19.8017)
y = 256.6399

256.6399 = 1.1717x + (9.1888)
x = 226.8744
x = 227

Thus, it is estimated that 227 cells for each of the control and main CAs will
require the same running time for the SAT attack as a bruteforce attack on 128 bits.
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9.8 Comparison of Running Times of 128bit AES with Effective 128bit Sum4
Cipher
To see the difference of speed between the Sum4 cipher with 128bits of effective
security and the 128bit AES cipher [NIS01c], the running times for encrypting 10, 50,
and 100 megabyte plaintexts were recorded. The AES implementation from libgcrypt
[KOC98] version 1.2.4 was called from a program implemented in the C language:
Plaintext Size (MB)

AES (secs)

Sum4 (secs)

10

0.1s

5m42.9s

50

0.6s

27m52.0s

100

1.2s

55m11.8s

Figure 9.26. The speed of encrypting plaintext blocks for 128bit AES and Sum4 with a
227cell configuration.

As it can be seen, the Sum4 cipher's software implementation is extremely slow.
This is due to the fact that several optimizations could not be done due to time
constraints. Currently, the implementation stores one cell value per memory location,
which is much less efficient than storing multiple cells per location. This also increases
load on the computer's memory controller, which results in a significant bottleneck. The
current implementation also is not parallel, which is unfortunate since cellular automata
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are highly parallel (all cells can be updated simultaneously since they only depend upon
the previous generation). Furthermore, cellular automata can be translated naturally into
hardware, though this is beyond the scope of the thesis and outside of the expertise of the
author. These improvements are noted in chapter 10: Future Work.

9.9 Number of Unique Streams
A strong stream cipher will generate unique streams with respect to unique keys.
If multiple keys result in the same keystream, then an attacker has a higher chance at
finding one key that generates that stream, as the effective key space would be reduced.
For small cell sizes, the unique streams resulting from the Sum4 cipher have been
tabulated. For each cell size below, the key space is bruteforced. For each key, a key
stream consisting of (2 x cell size)bits is generated and tested for uniqueness against key
streams from other keys (all within the same cell size). The number of unique key
streams are divided by the theoretical number of keystreams (22 x cell size) to give a
percentage of unique streams for that cell size.
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Cell Size

No. Possible Streams

No. Unique Streams

Pct. Unique

6

4,096

862

21.0%

7

16,384

4,348

26.5%

8

65,536

13,515

20.6%

9

262,144

49,264

18.8%

10

1,048,576

170,790

16.3%

11

4,194,304

593,684

14.2%

12

16,777,216

1,765,457

10.5%

13

67,108,864

5,981,877

8.9%

Figure 9.27. Low percentage of unique streams from the Sum4 cipher.

As it can be seen in the above figure, the Sum4 cipher does not produce many
unique streams. In order for the cipher to be practical, this must be fixed. This is noted in
chapter 10: Future Work.
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10. FUTURE WORK

As with any good research, there are ideas to expand upon and techniques to
improve.
Firstly, as pointed out in section 9.9, the Sum4 cipher does not produce a large
percentage of unique keystreams. This significant vulnerability in the security of the
cipher was not discovered until late in the research process. Due to time constraints, it
could not be rectified. However, we believe that it is a solvable problem. It may be
possible to combine the cipher with fast, noncryptographic pseudorandom number
generators such as the MWC or Xorshift generators mentioned in section 9.3. MWC and
Xorshift can be implemented very efficiently in both software and hardware, and have
very high execution speed. In theory, these generators could be incorporated into the
cipher design without much extra overhead.
Secondly, we believed since the initial cipher design that it is plausible that
multiple cells per generation could be sampled in order to generate multiple keystreams
from the same CAs. Work needs to be done to show that this is possible without
sacrificing the security of the cipher; an attacker could perform a knownplaintext attack
to recover parallel streams, but should not be able to discover enough information to
predict future bits from any stream. If this design idea is successful, then n parallel
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streams could be generated from the same amount of computation, or the throughput of
the cipher could be increased n times (where n is the number of cells that can be safely
sampled in parallel). This idea, too, might be implemented by combining fast, non
cryptographic generators into the cipher design. Unfortunately, this task was also not
pursued due to time constraints.
Thirdly, cycle lengths could be studied empirically for small cell sizes. Short
cycle lengths with respect to cell sizes would indicate a problem with the cipher. If a
plaintext longer than the cycle length were encrypted, the keystream would repeat itself,
degenerating into the vulnerable Vigenere cipher.
Fourth, the cipher's speed might be improved by replacing the control CA with a
fast, noncryptographic pseudorandom number generator. One would have to study the
randomness of its output and research what vulnerabilities, if any, might arise from such a
combination.
Fifth, a better software implementation of the Sum4 cipher could be made. The
current implementation does not incorporate any parallelism whatsoever, even though
cellular automata are naturally highly parallel. Furthermore, the current implementation
stores one cell value per memory location, which causes it to be memorybound. The
execution speed is largely regulated by the speed of the computer's memory controller.
This can be greatly improved by storing multiple cell values per memory location and
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operating upon all of them simultaneously in the processor's registers. These
improvements could speed up execution by many factors—enough to reach (or possibly
surpass) the speed of AES.
Sixth, cellular automata can be very efficiently implemented in hardware since all
cells can be updated synchronously each generation with only one clock cycle.
Unfortunately, hardware design and implementation is outside the expertise of the author.
Seventh, it would seem wise that a practical implementation of the cipher should
“prime the pump” as mentioned in [KAM04]; this involves transitioning an nbit CA n
times after startup and discarding the output so that the initial key is properly mixed into
the CA state. This concept should be studied more closely to see if more than n initial
bits should be discarded.
Lastly, the Sum4 cipher could be analyzed using the TestU01 random number
testing suite [LEC07], as it is mentioned in [LEC07] that the DIEHARD suite has several
shortcomings, some of which overlook statistical weaknesses in the Xorshift generator
[PAN05].
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11. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have provided an indepth literature search in chapters 2 through
8 covering all published papers arising from Wolfram's breakthrough idea to use cellular
automata in stream ciphers [WOL86]. In chapter 9, we presented a novel design for a
stream cipher based on cellular automata called Sum4 and studied its performance and
security properties. In chapter 10, we presented ideas for future work that can make the
Sum4 cipher both more secure and more efficient.
It is our hope that the work done in this thesis can either one day be used in a
practical system, or inspire future cryptographers to create practical systems using
versatile cellular automata.
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APPENDIX A: DIEHARD Test Descriptions

Below are the descriptions for all the tests used in DIEHARD, taken directly from
the testing suite itself [MAR98]:

Birthday Spacings: Choose m birthdays in a "year" of n days. List the
spacings between the birthdays. Let j be the number of values that occur
more than once in that list, then j is asymptotically Poisson distributed
with mean m^3/(4n). Experience shows n must be quite large, say
n>=2^18, for comparing the results to the Poisson distribution with that
mean. This test uses |n=2^24 and m=2^10, so that the underlying
distribution for j is taken to be Poisson with lambda=2^30/(2^26)=16. A
sample of 200 j's is taken, and a chisquare goodness of fit test provides a
p value. The first test uses bits 124 (counting from the left) from 32bit
integers in the specified file. The file is closed and reopened, then bits
225 of the same integers are used to provide birthdays, and so on to bits
932. Each set of bits provides a pvalue, and the nine pvalues provide a
sample for a KSTEST.
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GCD: Let the (32bit) RNG produce two successive integers u,v. Use
Euclids algorithm to find the gcd, say x, of u and v. Let k be the number
of steps needed to get x. Then k is approximately binomial with p=.376
and n=50, while the distribution of x is very close to Pr(x=i)=c/i^2, with
c=6/pi^2. The gcd test uses ten million such pairs u,v to see if the
resulting frequencies of k's and x's are consistent with the above
distributions. Congruential RNG'seven those with prime modulus
fail this test for the distribution of k, the number of steps, and often for
the distribution of gcd values x as well.

Gorilla: This is the GORILLA test, a strong version of the monkey tests
that I developed in the 70's. It concerns strings formed from specified bits
in 32bit integers from the RNG. We specify the bit position to be
studied, from 0 to 31, say bit 3. Then we generate 67,108,889 (2^26+25)
numbers from the generator and form a string of 2^26+25 bits by taking
bit 3 from each of those numbers. In that string of 2^26+25 bits we count
the number of 26bit segments that do not appear. That count should be
approximately normal with mean 24687971 and std. deviation 4170. This
leads to a normal zscore and hence to a pvalue. The test is applied for
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each bit position 0 (leftmost) to 31. (Some older tests use Fortran's 132
for most to least significant bits. Gorilla and newer tests use C's 0 to 31.)
This is the BINARY RANK TEST for 31x31 matrices. The leftmost 31
bits of 31 random integers from the test sequence are used to form a
31x31 binary matrix over the field {0,1}. The rank is determined. That
rank can be from 0 to 31, but ranks< 28 are rare, and their counts are
pooled with those for rank 28. Ranks are found for 40,000 such random
matrices and a chisquare test is performed on counts for ranks 31,30,28
and <=28. (The 31x31 choice is based on the unjustified popularity of the
proposed "industry standard" generator x(n) = 16807*x(n1) mod 2^311,
not a very good one.)

Binary rank (32x32): This is the BINARY RANK TEST for 32x32
matrices. A random 32x32 binary matrix is formed, each row a 32bit
random integer. The rank is determined. That rank can be from 0 to 32.
Ranks less than 29 are rare, and their counts are pooled with those for
rank 29. Ranks are found for 40,000 such random matrices and a
chisquare test is performed on counts for ranks 32,31, 30 and <=29.
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Binary rank (6x8): This is the BINARY RANK TEST for 6x8 matrices.
From each of six random 32bit integers from the generator under test, a
specified byte is chosen, and the resulting six bytes form a 6x8 binary
matrix whose rank is determined. That rank can be from 0 to 6, but ranks
0,1,2,3 are rare; their counts are pooled with those for rank 4. Ranks are
found for 100,000 random matrices, and a chisquare test is performed on
counts for ranks <=4, 5 and 6.

Bitstream: The file under test is viewed as a stream of bits. Call them |
b1,b2,... . Consider an alphabet with two "letters", 0 and 1 and think of
the stream of bits as a succession of 20letter "words", overlapping. Thus
the first word is b1b2...b20, the second is b2b3...b21, and so on. The
bitstream test counts the number of missing 20letter (20bit) words in a
string of 2^21 overlapping 20letter words. There are 2^20 possible 20
letter words. For a truly random string of 2^21+19 bits, the number of
missing words j should be (very close to) normally distributed with mean
141,909 and sigma 428. Thus (j141909)/428 should be a standard normal
variate (z score) that leads to a uniform [0,1) p value. The test is repeated
twenty times.
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OPSO (OverlappingPairsSparseOccupancy): The OPSO test
considers 2letter words from an alphabet of 1024 letters. Each letter is
determined by a specified ten bits from a 32bit integer in the sequence to
be tested. OPSO generates 2^21 (overlapping) 2letter words (from
2^21+1 "keystrokes") and counts the number of missing wordsthat is,
2letter words which do not appear in the entire sequence. That count
should be very close to normally distributed with mean 141,909, sigma
290. Thus (missingwrds141909)/290 should be a standard normal
variable. The OPSO test takes 32 bits at a time from the test file and uses
a designated set of ten consecutive bits. It then restarts the file for the
next designated 10 bits, and so on.

OQSO (OverlappingQuadruplesSparseOccupancy): The test
OQSO is similar, except that it considers 4letter words from an alphabet
of 32 letters, each letter determined by a designated string of 5
consecutive bits from the test file, elements of which are assumed 32bit
random integers. The mean number of missing words in a sequence of
2^21 four letter words, (2^21+3 "keystrokes"), is again 141909, with
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sigma = 295. The mean is based on theory; sigma comes from extensive
simulation.

DNA: The DNA test considers an alphabet of 4 letters: C,G,A,T,
determined by two designated bits in the sequence of random integers
being tested. It considers 10letter words, so that as in OPSO and OQSO,
there are 2^20 possible words, and the mean number of missing words
from a string of 2^21 (over lapping) 10letter words (2^21+9
"keystrokes") is 141909. The standard deviation sigma=339 was
determined as for OQSO by simulation. (Sigma for OPSO, 290, is the
true value (to three places), not determined by simulation.

Countthe1's (stream): This is the COUNTTHE1's TEST on a stream
of bytes. Consider the file under test as a stream of bytes (four per 32 bit
integer). Each byte can contain from 0 to 8 1's with probabilities
1,8,28,56,70,56,28,8,1 over 256. Now let the stream of bytes provide a
string of overlapping 5letter words, each "letter" taking values
A,B,C,D,E. The letters are determined by the number of 1's in a byte:
0,1,or 2 yield A 3 yields B, 4 yields C, 5 yields D and 6,7 or 8 yield E.
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Thus we have a monkey at a typewriter hitting five keys with vari ous
probabilities (37,56,70,56,37 over 256). There are 5^5 possible 5letter
words, and from a string of 256,000 (over lapping) 5letter words, counts
are made on the frequencies for each word. The quadratic form in the
weak inverse of the covariance matrix of the cell counts provides a
chisquare test: Q5Q4, the difference of the naive Pearson sums of (OBS
EXP)^2/EXP on counts for 5 and 4letter cell counts.

Countthe1's (specific): This is the COUNTTHE1's TEST for specific
bytes. Consider the file under test as a stream of 32bit integers. From
each integer, a specific byte is chosen , say the left most: bits 1 to 8.
Each byte can contain from 0 to 8 1's, with probabilitie
1,8,28,56,70,56,28,8,1 over 256. Now let the specified bytes from
successive integers provide a string of (overlapping) 5letter words, each
"letter" taking values A,B,C,D,E. The letters are determined by the
number of 1's, in that byte: 0,1,or 2 > A, 3 > B, 4 > C, 5 > D,
and 6,7 or 8 > E. Thus we have a monkey at a typewriter hitting five
keys with with various probabilities: 37,56,70, 56,37 over 256. There are
5^5 possible 5letter words, and from a string of 256,000 (overlapping) 5
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letter words, counts are made on the frequencies for each word. The
quadratic form in the weak inverse of the covariance matrix of the cell
counts provides a chisquare test: Q5Q4, the difference of the naive
Pearson sums of (OBSEXP)^2/EXP on counts for 5 and 4letter cell
counts.

Parking lot: In a square of side 100, randomly "park" a cara circle of
radius 1. Then try to park a 2nd, a 3rd, and so on, each time parking "by
ear". That is, if an attempt to park a car causes a crash with one already
parked, try again at a new random location. (To avoid path problems,
consider parking helicopters rather than cars.) Each attempt leads to
either a crash or a success, the latter followed by an increment to the list
of cars already parked. If we plot n: the number of attempts, versus k: the
number successfully parked, we get a curve that should be similar to
those provided by a perfect random number generator. Theory for the
behavior of such a random curve seems beyond reach, and as graphics
displays are not available for this battery of tests, a simple characteriz
ation of the random experiment is used: k, the number of cars
successfully parked after n=12,000 attempts. Simulation shows that k
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should average 3523 with sigma 21.9 and be approximate to normally
distributed. Thus (k3523)/21.9 should serve as a standard normal
variable, which, converted to a p uniform in [0,1), provides input to a
KSTEST based on a sample of 10.

Minimum Distance: It does this ten times: choose n=8000 random
points in a square of side 10000. Find d, the minimum distance between
the (n^2n)/2 pairs of points. If the points are truly inde pendent
uniform, then d^2, the square of the minimum distance should be (very
close to) exponentially distributed with mean .995 . Thus 1exp(
d^2/.995) should provide a pvalue and a KSTEST on the resulting 10
values serves as a test of uni formity for those samples of 8000 random
points in a square.

3D Spheres: Choose 4000 random points in a cube of edge 1000. At
each point, center a sphere large enough to reach the next closest point.
Then the volume of the smallest such sphere is (very close to)
exponentially distributed with mean 120pi/3. Thus the radius cubed is
exponential with mean 30. (The mean is obtained by extensive
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simulation). The 3DSPHERES test gener ates 4000 such spheres 20
times. Each min radius cubed leads to a uniform variable by means of 1
exp(r^3/30.), then a KSTEST is done on the 20 pvalues.

Squeeze: Random integers are floated to get uniforms on [0,1). Starting
with k=2^31=2147483647, the test finds j, the number of iterations
necessary to reduce k to 1, using the reduction k=ceiling(k*U), with U
provided by floating integers from the file being tested. Such j's are
found 100,000 times, then counts for the number of times j was
<=6,7,...,47,>=48 are used to provide a chisquare test for cell frequencies.

Overlapping Sums (OSUM): Integers are floated to get a sequence
U(1),U(2),... of uni form [0,1) variables. Then overlapping sums,
S(1)=U(1)+...+U(100), S2=U(2)+...+U(101),... are formed. The S's are
virtually normal with a certain covariance mat rix. A linear
transformation of the S's converts them to a sequence of independent
standard normals, which are converted to uniform variables for a
KSTEST.
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Craps 1: It plays 200,000 games of craps, counts the number of wins
and the number of throws necessary to end each game. The number of
wins should be (very close to) a normal with mean 200000p and variance
200000p(1p), and p=244/495. Throws necessary to complete the game
can vary from 1 to infinity, but counts for all>21 are lumped with 21. A
chisquare test is made on the no.ofthrows cell counts. Each 32bit
integer from the test file provides the value for the throw of a die, by
floating to [0,1), multiplying by 6 and taking 1 plus the integer part of the
result.

Craps 2: This is the CRAPS TEST with different dice. Each die value is
determined by the rightmost three bits of the 32bit random integer;
values 1 to 6 are accepted, others rejected. As in the first test, 200,000
games of craps are played, counting the number of wins and the number
of throws necessary to end each game. The number of wins should be
(very close to) a normal with mean 200000p and variance 200000p(1p),
and p=244/495. Throws necessary to complete the game can vary from 1
to infinity, but counts for all>21 are lumped with 21. A chisquare test is
made on the no.ofthrows cell counts.
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Overall: In response to requests, we have provided a list of all the p
values produced by the tests you have chosen for this run. The individual
pvalues are supposed to be uniform in [0,1), but they are not necessarily
independent. So even though we have applied a KSTEST to the
accumulated pvalues, the result is not necessarilyeven if your file
contains truly random bitsuniform in [0,1). But it is probably pretty
close, so take that last pvalue with a grain of salt. In particular, there
may be some values so close to 0 or 1 that the tests they came from
should be applied several more times, or new, related tests should be
undertaken.
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APPENDIX B: Developer Manual

The following describes how to compile all software associated with this Master's thesis
paper. Note that all software was developed and tested on Linux. While it probably can
work with little or no changes on other platforms, no guarantees can be made.

1.) The four PHP scripts (autoresults.php, autotester.php, boolgenrules.php, and
lfsrtest.php) do not need to be compiled.

2.) To compile CASAT.java, ensure that Java v5 is installed and type at a command
prompt:

$ javac CASAT.java

3.) The four C programs (aes.c, mwc.c, s4ca.c, and xorshift.c) can be compiled with a
single Makefile. aes.c requires that libgcrypt v.1.2.0 or later (and its development files)
be installed. It is available as a precompiled package on many Linux distributions,
including Ubuntu (or it can be compiled from source from <http://www.gnupg.org/> as of
April 16, 2008.)
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Ensure that a working gcc environment is available and that the four C programs are in
the same directory as the Makefile and type:

$ make
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APPENDIX C: User Manual

The following describes how to use all software associated with this Master's thesis paper.
Note that all software was developed and tested on Linux. While it probably can work
with little or no changes on other platforms, no guarantees can be made.

autotester.php

Description: This script runs the DIEHARD suite on all the *.rnd files in the specified
directory. If 'test_directory' is the name of the directory containing *.rnd files, then the
results are put in 'test_directory_results'.

Usage:

$ php autotester.php test_directory

autoresults.php

Description: Processes the results from the autotester.php script. When run on the
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result directory created by that script, this script will compile and tabulate the results into
a file called 'results.txt' in the result directory.

Usage:

$ php autoresults.php results_directory

boolgenrules.php

Description: This script generates the CNF expressions for onedimensional, oneradius
CA rules in the $rules array. It outputs the expressions into a Java code string so that it
may be directly imported. This script was used to generate the 'ruleCNFs' array in
CASAT.java.

Usage:

$ php boolgenrules.php

lfsrtest.php

Description: This script takes 256 bits from the Sum4 key stream (given by the user as
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the program argument) and calculates a 256bit linear finite shift register (LFSR) that is
capable of generating those bits. It then uses the LFSR to generate another 512 kilobits
and compares them to the next 512 kilobits in the key stream file. It tabulates how many
bits match and how many differ. If an LFSR can approximate the key stream of a
generator, then this is strong evidence that it is weak.
Tests performed on the Sum4 cipher suggest that a 256bit LFSR can
predict its output no better than random guessing, as close to 50% of the bits match. This
is a good sign of security.
This script requires SAGE to be installed. SAGE is an opensource
mathematics program that contains an implementation of J.L. Massey's algorithm to
construct an LFSR based on output bits (in section 3 of "Shiftregister synthesis and BCH
decoding," IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory,
vol. IT15, pp. 122127, Jan. 19 69.). SAGE is available at:
<http://modular.math.washington.edu/sage/>.
This script will periodically save its progress to 'file.rnd.lfsr' so that if
interrupted, it can automatically resume where it left off. That file will contain the batch
number (which is of no concern to the user), number of similar bits, and total number of
bits tested in a format such as "12|6294636|12582912".
To use this script, edit the $SAGE_DIR variable to point to the directory
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where SAGE is installed, then execute:

Usage:

$ php lfsrtest.php file.rnd

CASAT.java

Description: This program outputs a boolean expression for the Sum4 stream
cipher. The expression will be in conjunctive normal form (CNF) and is suitable for
processing by a SAT solver such as zChaff. It is also able to calculate the number of
unique key streams from a certain cell size. Lastly, it can bruteforce a cipher so that
timing information can be obtained with respect to CA size.

Usage:

To generate a CNF file with 18 cells (for control and main CAs *each*)

and with 36 output bits:

$ java CASAT cells=18 outputFactor=2 \
output=cell18_output36.cnf
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To calculate the number of unique key streams arising from 8 cells and 16 output bits:

$ java CASAT cells=8 outputFactor=2 test
uniqueness

To bruteforce a 14cell cipher with 14 output bits (NOTE: this option is obsoleted by the
s4ca.c program!):

$ time java CASAT cells=14 outputFactor=1 
bruteforce

aes.c

Description: This program encrypts a set plaintext block with 128bit AES. It is useful
for benchmarking purposes only.

Usage (to encrypt 10MB of plaintext and put it into file.enc):
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$ ./aes 10 file.enc

mwc.c

Description: This is an implementation of the Multiple with Carry (MWC) random
number generator, published by G. Marsaglia (2003) in "Xorshift RNGs", Journal of
Statistical Software, vol. 8, no. 14, pp. 16.

Usage:

$ ./mwc 10 tenmegs.rnd

s4ca.c

Description: This is the (relatively) optimized version of the cipher. It can:
•

run the cipher with any number of cells.

•

create files of any size containing the key stream.

•

provide time measurements for generating key streams.

•

bruteforce a cipher with any number of cells.
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Usage:

To output 5 megabytes into the file 'stream.rnd' using 256 cells for the control and main
CAs each:

$ ./s4ca cells=256 outputmegs=5 \
outputfile=stream.rnd

To bruteforce a cipher with 14 cells and 28 output bits:

$ ./s4ca cells=14 outputbits=28 bruteforce

xorshift.c

Description: This is an implementation of the XORshift random number generator,
published by G. Marsaglia (2003) in "Xorshift RNGs", Journal of Statistical Software,
vol. 8, no. 14, pp. 16.
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Usage:

$ ./xorshift 20 twentymegs.rnd
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